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Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and
Congress in U.S. Constitutional Democracy
VICKI C. JACKSON*
In recent years, legislatures and their members have increasingly asserted standing to sue other branches of government, in controversies involving state legislators
or legislatures as party litigants and in controversies involving members of or parts
of the U.S. Congress. These cases present challenging questions for the federal
Article III courts, whose jurisdiction has been interpreted to be bounded by “justiciability” doctrines, including that the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must
have standing to do so.
This Essay will focus on congressional standing, discussing case law involving
claims by state legislatures or legislators to the extent they are relevant.1 It will examine congressional standing—including standing of individual Members of
Congress, standing of parts of Congress, and standing for the whole body—within
the context of U.S. commitments to democratic constitutionalism, offering a framework for analysis that is intended more to suggest ways of thinking about
congressional standing than to prescribe a set of answers.
I. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND STANDING
In most theories of democratic constitutionalism, major issues of policy are to be
determined by legislatures; executive and administrative branches may fill out policy
details in implementing such laws. Courts typically are not given authority to
govern—their authority is to assure that the other branches govern in accordance
with law. This is especially so in the United States, where the federal courts play a

* Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. With
thanks to Judith Resnik, Mark Tushnet, Dick Fallon, Marty Lederman, Gillian Metzger, Tara
Grove, Richard Primus, Dawn Johnson, Lauren Robel, Donna Nagy, Victor Quintanilla,
Wendy Perdue, Jack Preis, Robert Taylor, and others for helpful comments and discussions,
to the Indiana University Maurer School of Law faculty for affording me the opportunity to
present the Smith Lecture on April 3, 2017, and to the University of Richmond Law School
for the opportunity to present this work in a faculty workshop in April 2017. I also want to
thank Gabriella Blum, Glenn Cohen, Louis Kaplow, Michael Klarman, John Manning, Holger
Spamann, Laurence Tribe, Adrian Vermeule, Mark Wu, Daniel Francis, and other members
of the Harvard Law School community who provided helpful comments in connection with
my presenting a version of this essay at a faculty workshop over the summer of 2017. I am
grateful for the helpful research assistance provided by Caroline Cox, Eleanor Davis, and
Kamika Shaw, all Harvard JD expected 2018, and Harry Larson, Harvard JD expected 2019.
I served as Court-appointed pro bono amica curiae in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), to argue against the Court’s jurisdiction on two grounds, one of which was that
a congressional committee lacked standing to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute
challenged in that case.
1. Some aspects of the standing of state and federal legislators will overlap. But suits by
Members of Congress also raise distinctive separation of powers concerns not present in suits
by state legislators. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 39, 50–75.
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significant role in reviewing the legality of government action but, in James
Madison’s words, may exercise jurisdiction only in matters of a “Judiciary Nature.”2
This limitation on the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts has been defined
through a series of “justiciability” doctrines, including standing. Unlike the “constitutional courts” of Europe, federal courts do not exercise jurisdiction over
“generalized grievances”; under current standing law, Article III courts cannot
adjudicate claims unless the party invoking their jurisdiction has “standing” to do
so.3 In order to have standing, a party must allege an “injury,” arising from “invasion
of a legally protected interest which is [] concrete and particularized,”4 in a dispute
“traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.”5
Despite its theoretical preeminence in governance, Congress has fallen on hard
times (as have legislatures around the world). In standardized surveys of confidence
in major institutions, Congress has fallen to astonishing lows in comparison to both
the presidency and the Supreme Court—indeed, in comparison with virtually every
other institution asked about.6 Scholars of the Congress, like Thomas Mann and
Norman Ornstein, began warning of a “broken branch” in their 2006 book, and six
years later wrote It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional
System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism.7 In recent years we have seen
repeated defaults in governance by Congress—threatening not to allow payment of
the national debt, provoking repeated government shutdowns, and blocking consideration of nominees.8
As Congress’s functionality has declined, efforts by congressional actors to litigate issues in federal courts have presented federal courts many opportunities to consider legislative standing. In 1997 the Supreme Court, in Raines v. Byrd,9 rejected
standing for several Members of Congress challenging the constitutionality of the

2. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
3. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984).
4. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 752 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
6. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/DR7A-RMM7] (finding that as of 2016 only 9% of survey
respondents, when asked, had either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress;
this was much lower than all other institutions studied, including the presidency (36%) and
the Supreme Court (36%)). The 2017 data from administration of the same survey is similar:
12% having a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress, compared with 32% for
the presidency and 40% for the Supreme Court. Id.
7. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM (2012) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS];
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).
8. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 7; Katharine
G. Young, American Exceptionalism and Government Shutdowns: A Comparative
Constitutional Reflection on the 2013 Lapse in Appropriations, 94 B.U. L. REV. 991 (2014)
9. 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
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Line Item Veto Act, an Act later invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York.10 Notwithstanding the clear effort in Raines v. Byrd to tighten standing requirements,
Members of Congress continue to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a
wide range of disputes with the Executive Branch. In United States v. Windsor (2013)
(in which I was the Court-appointed amicus curiae asked to argue against the Court’s
jurisdiction), the House of Representatives Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
asserted standing to intervene and appeal to defend the constitutionality of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act.11 One Justice, in dissent, accepted standing of the
congressional advisory group;12 three others, also in dissent, rejected it;13 and the
majority did not reach the question.14
Significantly revised understandings of injury for standing purposes developed in
order to accommodate new claims by environmental organizations and their members for environmental and even aesthetic injuries.15 Thus, newly asserted forms of
injury were recognized as such for standing purposes. But unlike the twentieth century recognition of environmental harm as a judicially cognizable interest, often promoted by public interest organizations that emerged in the twentieth century,
Congress as an institution has been around since the Founding, as have the interests
of its members in the due enforcement of the laws. What is novel here is not the
institution nor the claim of an interest in how the laws are enforced (historically
addressed through legislative oversight), but rather the tendency for Members of
Congress to come into court over public disputes with other government offices
rather than using other avenues of relief outside the courts to try to prevail in their
positions.
One recent example is the action by the House of Representatives at issue in U.S.
House of Representatives v. Burwell,16 challenging the implementation of the
Affordable Care Act as inconsistent with the Appropriation Clause and constitutional
provisions conferring the legislative power on Congress. Another fairly recent example is Crawford v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,17 in which Senator Ron Paul,
among other plaintiffs, challenged certain intergovernmental agreements as treaties
requiring Senate approval.
Such cases, part of a broader trend of governments, including legislative bodies
or their members, resorting to the courts,18 might be seen as a healthy development,

10. 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998).
11. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
12. See id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 2699–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 2688.
15. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
16. 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016).
17. No. 3:15-cv-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015).
18. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2665 (2015); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–21 (2007). For cases in the
lower courts, see, for example, New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1216–19
(10th Cir. 2017); Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 F.3d 1207, 1214–17 (10th Cir. 2016); Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
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consistent with developments in other countries towards resort to the courts for
resolution of a wider range of constitutional disputes. It might be thought to benefit
the rule of law by providing more certainty and clarity to disputed constitutional
questions and by increasing the measures to secure executive compliance with law.
It might also reflect the enhanced stature of the courts; or instead, the ease of using
the courts to take a public position that will be politically beneficial.19 Or it might be
taken as a sensible reaction to the growing power of the Executive Branch, with resort to the courts to provide a rule of law check on abuse in executive and
administrative departments.
On the other hand, the trend might be viewed as an unhealthy symptom of, and
contributor to, a declining faith in democratic politics, a willingness to use courts in
lieu of constitutionally available political processes, and thereby further to empower
courts that are, relative to constitutional courts elsewhere, untethered in any systematic way to the unfolding political contexts in which democratic constitutionalism
lives. Legislative standing might be thought to detract from the capacities of the
political processes to resolve important questions, if the courts routinely come to the
rescue over political disagreements. And the perceived legitimacy of the courts might
over the long run suffer, especially if their decisions come to be seen as no more than
tools in political battles.
Thus, the positive values of judicial resolution in enhancing the clarity of the law
and restraining executive abuse must be weighed against the risks that the courts may
choose wrong answers that do not help governance or that overall democratic functioning will be impaired by increasing dependence on the courts to resolve disputes.
This Essay is an effort to analyze and weigh these values and risks in several
distinctive contexts involving claims of congressional standing.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND STANDING
Standing is a question of constitutional law in the United States. Constitutional
interpretation in the Supreme Court typically draws on several sources: text and
original understandings; precedent and interpretation over time, including history
outside of the courts; values and purposes of the constitutional provisions involved;
and the consequences of alternative interpretations.20 How do these different sources
bear on different kinds of legislative standing questions?
Text: Article III’s language of “cases” and “controversies” is not self-explicating.
History and precedent, as discussed below, should play an important role in their
understanding. But the powers of other branches are more specific and are quite
varied; the scope of those powers and what power is at issue should, as Professor

906 (2016).
19. On credit-claiming postures of elected officials, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61–62 (2d ed. 2014).
20. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1987); Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-Valenced
Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599, 599–601 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The United States:
Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 7, 17–45 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
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Tara Grove has argued, matter in understanding questions of standing.21
For example, the Court has stated that under the Take Care Clause, it is the
Executive Branch that has the responsibility for carrying out the laws, including
through litigation;22 legislative standing premised on broad claims that the President
is violating the Take Care Clause might thus be thought inconsistent with this
allocation of authority. However, where a state legislature’s (or legislators’) votes
have been “completely nullified” in the Court’s view, standing has on rare occasion
been upheld, where the injury asserted is to a constitutionally specified power to ratify proposed amendments under Article V or to set “Times, Places and Manner” of
congressional elections as provided in Article I, Section 4.23 As these areas suggest,
standing analysis may thus vary depending on the particular substantive claim under
distinct constitutional (or statutory) provisions.
Precedent and History: Issues of legislative standing may arise both in suits
brought by individual members in their own right and by a house or an entire legislative body. Although precedent may play an important role in the development of
constitutional law,24 relatively few Supreme Court cases involve legislative standing,
and of these, even fewer address the standing of Congress or its members. There is
surely no longstanding history of Congress or its houses bringing suit against other
parts of the federal government or officers acting on its behalf.25 Indeed, the first case
of which I am aware in which the Court suggested that Congress or its houses would
have standing as such was decided in 1983: INS v. Chadha26 is frequently cited for
the proposition that Congress has standing to defend the constitutionality of laws not
defended by the Executive Branch. Despite dictum characterizing Congress as the
appropriate party to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the Executive
Branch does not do so, I will argue below that the case may be better understood as
resting on Congress’s authority to defend its own asserted statutory prerogative to
vote a “one-house veto” on agency action.27
The Court’s most recent decision concerning the standing of members of
Congress was in 1997. In Raines v. Byrd, the standing of individual members of
Congress to bring suit to contest the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act was
rejected.28 The Court found that the legislators (who had voted against the Act)
lacked the necessary personal stake in the outcome.29 Responding to the claim that

21. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1311 (2014).
22. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135–41 (1976) (per curiam).
23. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
438–41 (1939). For further discussion of Coleman, see infra note 48 and infra notes 30–31,
33, 39, 101 and accompanying text.
24. See generally DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
25. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113–14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Historically,
political disputes between Members of the Legislative and the Executive Branches were
resolved without resort to the courts.”).
26. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 112–133.
28. See 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
29. See id. at 818–20 (discussing the “personal” stake requirement).
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the Act diminished the effect of their votes for future legislation, the Court drew a
distinction between such claims and those of state legislators in the 1939 decision in
Coleman v. Miller.30 In Coleman, the votes of half the members of the Kansas Senate
against ratifying a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution would, on their
theory that the lieutenant governor was not allowed to vote, have been “virtually held
for naught,”31 or, as described by Raines v. Byrd, “completely nullified,” by giving
effect to the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in support of ratification.32
Coleman, the Raines Court wrote, “stands (at most) for the proposition that
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific
legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”33
Raines’ treatment of Coleman suggests that cases addressing the requirements for
state legislator standing would also be applied, as minimal criteria, to claims of standing by Members of Congress.
Drawing on the history of constitutional collisions between Congress and
Presidents over time, Raines v. Byrd concluded that congressional attempts to litigate

30. See id. at 821–24 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)). Raines v. Byrd
also suggested a distinction between claims personal to a particular legislator (“a prerogative
of personal power”) and claims relating to the institutional “seat” of the legislator (as “trustee”
for constituents), 521 U.S. at 821, a distinction subject to critique as a basis for determining
injury for standing purposes. See, e.g., Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers:
The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1746–47 (1999). Had the Court
meant to rest only on this distinction, however, it would have been unnecessary to distinguish
Coleman. I therefore read Raines as resting on a more complex and nuanced set of factors.
31. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S at 438.
32. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 823.
33. Id. at 823 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent District Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), went further in its attempt
to discredit Coleman as “a peculiar case that may well stand for nothing”:
[There were] two votes to affirm on the merits, two to reverse on the merits
(without discussing standing) and four to dismiss for lack of standing. Justice
Stanley Reed, who was on the Court and apparently participated in the case, is
not mentioned in any of the opinions recorded in the United States Reports. So,
in order to find Coleman a binding precedent on standing, rather than a 4–to–4
standoff, one must assume that Justice Reed voted with Hughes. There is some
reason to make that assumption: The four Justices rejecting standing went on to
discuss the merits, because “the ruling of the Court just announced removes from
the case the question of petitioners’ standing to sue.” 307 U.S. at 456 (Black, J.,
concurring). But then again, if nine Justices participated, how could it be that on
one of the two issues in the case the Court was “equally divided and therefore . .
. expresse[d] no opinion”? Id. at 447. A pretty shaky foundation for a significant
precedential ruling. . . . And even under the most generous assumptions, since
the Court’s judgment on the issue it resolved rested on the ground that that issue
presented a political question—which is itself a rejection of jurisdiction,
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)—Coleman’s discussion of the
additional jurisdictional issue of standing was quite superfluous and arguably
nothing but dictum. The peculiar decision in Coleman should be charitably
ignored.
Id. at 2696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the dispute were contrary to historical experience. The Court’s opinion discussed at
length the Tenure in Office Act, whose constitutionality was at issue in the impeachment proceedings of President Andrew Johnson in a disagreement between the
political branches that continued for more than another half century before it was
resolved in a lawsuit brought by a person claiming to have been unlawfully removed
from office.34 Moreover, even though the Line Item Veto Act had specifically
authorized suits by individual Members of Congress to challenge its constitutionality, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had not been authorized by their houses to bring
the lawsuit.35 And further, as the Court also noted, in this case Congress had other
remedies to vindicate its interests—including repeal of the Act or exempting appropriations bills from its reach.36 Finally, it noted, nothing foreclosed a challenge to the
Act by someone who suffered judicially cognizable injury under it.37 In light of the
multiple factors considered, it is thus uncertain how broadly or narrowly to read
Raines with respect to standing by congressional actors.38

34. See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 826–28; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926).
35. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829. While noting this factor, the Court did not elaborate
on its implications.
36. Id. at 829; cf. Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1058 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating,
in denying standing to congressional plaintiffs challenging alleged failure to enforce
immigration laws, that although the existence of other remedies is not relevant to standing, the
parties might have a remedy through the legislative process).
37. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829.
38. The D.C. Circuit has had a series of important decisions on legislative standing,
several of which are discussed in Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Chenoweth read Raines as a major curtailment of the possibility of congressional standing,
requiring a showing of “complete nullification” in order to sustain congressional standing, and
thus casting doubt on the reasoning in earlier D.C. Circuit decisions. Id. at 117. Judge Tatel,
while agreeing that under Raines congressional plaintiffs lacked standing in Chenoweth to
challenge the validity of various executive orders designed to protect rivers, wrote separately
to say that the Chenoweth majority read Raines too broadly. I quote at length from his opinion,
as it also provides a brief summary of prior standing cases in the circuit:
[U]nlike appellants, the legislators in Kennedy and Moore challenged alleged
constitutional defects in the way specific pieces of legislation were passed or
defeated. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 951–53 (revenue-raising bill allegedly
originated in the Senate, not the House); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434–36 (allegedly
unconstitutional presidential pocket veto of legislation passed by Congress).
Contrary to appellants’ claim that they have been “denied the ‘right[] to
participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution,’”
Appellant’s Br. at 16 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 951), they can point to no
defect in any “discrete aspect of the process by which a bill becomes law (the
actual vote on the legislation) [or] those post-enactment events denying the bill’s
status as law,” Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This case
is therefore indistinguishable from and controlled by United Presbyterian
Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984). There, as here,
a Member of Congress challenged the legality of an executive order, claiming
that it was promulgated without congressional or constitutional authorization.
See id. at 1381–82. We held that the Member lacked standing because he raised
only “‘a generalized grievance about the conduct of government, not a claim
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Indeed, whether the “complete nullification” theory would support congressional
standing at all is itself unclear; the Court’s most recent decision upholding the standing of a state legislature on this basis specifically cautioned that “a suit between
Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent
here.”39 In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission,40 the Court found that the State Legislature had standing to challenge a
ballot initiative requiring that districting be done by an independent commission.
This ballot initiative, the Legislature alleged, completely stripped it of its asserted
right under the U.S. Constitution to do districting directly. If the Arizona Legislature
were correct on the merits of its constitutional claim, then the action complained of
would have completely nullified their right to vote, bringing it within the standing
rule of Coleman v. Miller.41
As this brief survey suggests, legislative standing has been upheld thus far only
in quite limited circumstances; little support exists in precedent or history for the
Congress, as a legislative body, to sue the Executive Branch as a general matter over
constitutional issues.

founded on injury to the legislator by distortion of the process by which a bill
becomes law.’” Id. at 1382 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 952); see also Daughtrey
v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting the argument that
legislators have standing to challenge executive nonenforcement of an act as a
usurpation of the legislative right to enact repealing legislation); Harrington, 553
F.2d at 211 (rejecting the argument that a legislator has standing to challenge
allegedly illegal CIA activities as an impairment of his prospective votes on
related legislation).
Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 117–18 (Tatel, J., concurring). For cases in other circuits, see, for
example, Hansen v. Nat’l Comm’n on the Observance of Int’l Women’s Year, 628 F.2d 533,
534 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The injury alleged by appellant is an injury which he suffers along with
all other citizens of the United States. He has not presented any facts which show he has
sustained or is imminently in danger of sustaining an actual personal injury.”); Harrington v.
Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (rejecting legislator standing to challenge
expenditures for combat in other countries in alleged violation of law); see also Baird v.
Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting state legislators’ challenge to approval
by Secretary of Interior of gaming compacts between the state and Indian tribe; finding claim
of injury due to use of concurrent resolution voting procedure in the legislature (majority of
those present) rather than a more rigorous procedure (majority of all legislators) was only a
generalized grievance, and also rejecting theory of “complete nullification” because only two
legislators were party plaintiffs and their votes alone would not have been sufficient to defeat
the measure).
39. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665
n.12 (2015); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 819–20 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional.”); id. at 824 n.8 (noting that it did not need to decide whether Coleman was
distinguishable in additional ways, including that it did not pose the separation of powers
concerns that congressional standing does); id. at 832 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that Coleman may be distinguishable because the action by state senators
did not pose federal separation of powers concerns).
40. 135 S. Ct. 2652.
41. See id. at 2665–66.
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But, it must be acknowledged, this approach is not a necessary feature of courts
engaged in constitutional review. Reasonably well-functioning systems of
constitutional democracy, as in France or Germany, authorize parts of the legislature
to challenge the constitutionality of statutes or, in the case of Germany, to resolve
jurisdictional disputes between two organs of the federal government, before the constitutional court.42 In such countries there is typically a specific constitutional
provision contemplating or authorizing such suits. There is no such provision in the
U.S. Constitution. U.S. history and precedent both regard the jurisdiction of the
federal courts as more narrow. Indeed, even where Congress has conferred standing
on private parties, the Court has found limits on its ability to do so, as in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.43
Values: Constitutional values exist on both sides of many questions of standing.
A fundamental value in U.S. constitutionalism is the rule of law: “The government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men.”44 Yet the values of representative democracy are also central to U.S.
constitutionalism; these values contemplate self-governance by the people through
their elected representatives. There are many ways in which these values can be
reconciled, including through forms of deference by courts to the decisions of elected
branches. But justiciability limits, including standing, have been viewed as playing
a role in limiting the occasions of judicial intervention to situations where there has
been a specific injury to particular persons.45
Purpose and Consequence: Constitutional adjudication frequently invokes both
the general purposes of constitutional provisions or doctrines and a concern for the
consequences of alternative interpretation. Standing requirements are sometimes
justified as ensuring that the parties most directly affected should be those who
litigate,46 a requirement that is also sometimes linked to the idea that courts

42. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547–
83 (3d ed. 2014). There are systems that permit individuals who have only an ideological
interest in a matter to challenge a set of allegedly unconstitutional conditions, as in India. Id.
at 747–64.
43. 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
45. See supra text accompanying note 29 (referring to the concrete injury requirement).
Thus, in Marbury, the Court emphasized the importance of an individual claim of injury: “The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
46. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case
or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). For an argument in favor of
congressional standing in separation of powers disputes on the grounds that Members of
Congress know more and are better situated concretely to explicate the interest at stake, see
Note, supra note 30, at 1754. Members of Congress, however, may also have stronger
incentives to litigate for partisan political purposes, regardless of the longer term institutional
interests of their organ of government. Cf. Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 n.4
(D.D.C. 2011) (“While there may conceivably be some political benefit in suing the President
and the Secretary of Defense, in light of shrinking judicial budgets, scarce judicial resources,
and a heavy caseload, the Court finds it frustrating to expend time and effort adjudicating the
relitigation of settled questions of law.”).
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adjudicate best when they see the concrete implications of challenged action in particular cases affecting particular persons. Standing is one of several “justiciability”
doctrines found implicit in the case or controversy requirements of Article III. Three
sets of purposes are commonly identified for these justiciability limits more generally: first, lack of judicial competence or concerns for how courts are best able to
adjudicate; second, exclusive competence in another branch; and third, avoiding
harms to courts and political branches from courts adjudicating too wide a span of
sensitive public law disputes involving conflict between the courts and other
branches of government.
Lack of Judicial Competence: The concrete injury requirement, the Court has
said, helps preserve the separation of powers because courts lack the competence to
resolve constitutional issues abstractly,47 or are more likely to do a good job if they
are adjudicating legal issues in concrete context. This argument may be tied to a
broader concept of how courts should decide cases48—with attention to particular
facts, with a kind of decisional humility that allows a set of decisions on a variety of
facts to accumulate incrementally. But the Court has frequently decided
constitutional questions in close to abstract settings, for example, when it adjudicates
facial challenges to newly enacted laws, before they are enforced against particular
persons.49 While the idea of judicial modesty that lies behind the competence claim
has appeal, it is not always applied.
Exclusive Competence Elsewhere: A second set of reasons underlying
justiciability limits is that other branches have exclusive competence over a question.
An example: A challenge by a federal judge removed from office by impeachment
and conviction to the procedures used by the Senate in conducting his trial was found
nonjusticiable because of the Senate’s exclusive competence over the trial of impeachments.50 Concerns for the competence of other branches sometimes surface in
standing cases: in Allen v. Wright,51 the Court implied that where there is no
disagreement about the controlling legal norm, but only about its execution, standing
should be more strictly applied to avoid judicial entanglement in the work of the
Executive Branch.52

47. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576–77.
48. Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“The abstract nature of the harm—for
example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed—deprives the case of the
concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were ‘the traditional concern
of the courts at Westminster,’ Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and
which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory
opinion.”).
49. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
50. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993).
51. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
52. See id. at 759–60 (discussing separation of powers in context of concerns about
plaintiffs “challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the
particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations”). In Wright, the IRS
did not argue that it had no obligation to avoid giving tax exemptions to racist schools, but
rather claimed that its enforcement method was adequate to the goal; plaintiffs disagreed. See
id. at 744–45 (“Respondents allege that, despite the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status
to racially discriminatory private schools and despite the IRS guidelines and procedures for
implementing that policy, some of the tax-exempt racially segregated private schools created
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Reducing Occasions for Judicial Review and Confrontations with Political
Branches: A third set of reasons for the justiciability requirements is that they reduce
the number of occasions where the Court must confront the political branches of the
federal government.53 Why is this desirable? What are the potential harms of such
confrontations? And are those harms exacerbated when the confrontations involve
head-on collisions in litigation directly between Congress or parts thereof and the
Executive Branch?
One kind of concern is that, despite traditions of obedience to the Court’s judgments, the Court has to be careful, as a matter of judicial statesmanship, in not overdrawing the reservoir of diffuse support for its institutional role;54 issuing rulings that
are ignored or defied, it is thought, may impair the court’s effectiveness more
generally. Political scientists sometimes speak of constitutional courts operating
within a zone of tolerance of those who hold political power.55 If political branches
cease accepting the Court’s judgments because they exceed their tolerances or those
of a majority of the public, then the rule of law will suffer a major blow. The history
of intergovernmental litigation in the United States has involved some moments of
genuine uncertainty over compliance.56
Another kind of risk is that the Court might receive too much respect, on too many
issues, to the detriment of democratic decision making and wise policy making. We

or expanded in desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory policies.”); see also
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,’ Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, ‘to assume
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,’ and to
become ‘“virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”’”)
(citations omitted).
53. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552–53 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[S]tanding doctrine keeps courts out of political disputes by denying private
litigants the right to test the abstract legality of government action. See Schlesinger, supra, at
222. And by limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement authority to private
plaintiffs and the courts, standing doctrine preserves executive discretion.”).
54. On diffuse support, see, for example, Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); Walter F.
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Explaining Diffuse Support for the United States Supreme
Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037 (1974).
55. For the discussion of the idea of “tolerance” intervals, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight
& Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance
of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001).
56. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (ordering the President to turn
over what turned out to be incriminating tapes in an action brought by a specially appointed
federal public prosecutor and the President); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
286–87 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the challenges of enforcing judgments in litigation involving
states, and referring to one of several Supreme Court decisions involving the struggle over
many years and iterations of litigation to enforce the Court’s judgment that West Virginia pay
a debt owed to Virginia).
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might think of this as a risk of judicial supersupremacy.57 The Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court are, we may assume, very smart lawyers, but they are only nine in
number, and they are not necessarily practiced in the art of actual governance.
Moreover, U.S. Article III judges, including the Supreme Court Justices, serve terms
that are indefinite, unlike the justices of well-known constitutional courts who serve
time-limited terms (e.g., in Germany or South Africa, with twelve-year terms), and
unlike the justices of other well-known high courts that decide constitutional
questions who serve until a stated retirement age (e.g., Australia, age seventy, or
Canada, age seventy-five). The absence of regular replacement through mandatory
retirement or term limits compounds the challenges for a court deciding important
constitutional questions.58
The risks of incorrect decisions may be particularly high with respect to separation
of powers issues. Recent scholarly work suggests that the effect of a particular
separation of powers issue on the overall distribution of governing powers is very
difficult to determine;59 other scholarly work on the appropriations process suggests
that since 1789 it has been subject to a complex set of customs not revealed simply
by reading the statutes.60 Such work may imply that courts’ competence to get correct
answers in these areas of interbranch relations is at its weakest in resolving these
issues.
A third kind of risk from repeated adjudication of disputes between the two
elected branches, especially when those two branches or members thereof are the
contesting parties in a litigation,61 is that Congress may be encouraged in its current

57. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the
Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445,
2455 (1998) (discussing other federal courts’ doctrines reflecting the Court’s own
“supersupremacy”).
58. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 538–40 (showing that justices in Germany
and South Africa also face mandatory retirement, which may shorten the term in office); see
also Vicki C. Jackson, Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing and the Institutional
Framework of Article III: A Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1783, 1800–
04 (2016) (exploring structural differences, including in terms served and regularity of
replacement, the justices’ prior experience in government, and ease of constitutional
amendment, between the U.S. Supreme Court and other constitutional courts).
59. See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Discounting Accountability, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents
/16_10_10%20Nicholas%20Stephanopoulos_Discounting%20Accountability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4W6-2YJX] (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that the Court’s
assumptions about what constitutional interpretations will increase electoral accountability
may be mistaken or unproven); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1674 (2014) (arguing against judicial enforcement of constitutional
rules claimed to prohibit innovations agreed on between Congress and the President because
of “skeptic[ism] that courts will identify accurately instances in which institutional bargains
go too far”).
60. See LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES (Archon Books 1971) (1943).
61. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833–34 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (indicating that graver separation of powers concerns for the role of courts are posed
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disinclination to take the responsibility of governance seriously. As Professor James
Bradley Thayer argued long ago, too much judicial oversight can lead to a sapping
of a sense of constitutional and political responsibility in the elected branches.62 His
article, written in 1893, suggested that legislators might act less responsibly if they
believe that the Court will stand at the ready to correct their excesses and failures of
due consideration.
Some observers may argue that the breakdown of congressional norms (such as
respect for the opposition, or commitment to regular legislative process in
lawmaking) and the rise of legislative gridlock provide reasons for the courts to be
more active, to view more cases as justiciable. How does a breakdown in the
legislative process relate to justiciability and more specifically to standing? A leading
defense of the Court’s decisions in the two Bush v. Gore cases63 is that chaos would
have ensued without the Court’s intervention.64 This defense necessarily turns on the
idea that the procedures of the Twelfth Amendment for congressional resolution of
disputed votes, arguably applicable to all contests over electoral votes for President,65
were no longer controlling or practicable.66 I am not convinced that this was correct,
nor am I convinced by similar arguments for recognizing congressional standing as
a response to legislative dysfunctionality.
It is a fundamental obligation of elected democratic governments to govern.67
While the complex filters of the legislative process were deliberately designed to

in litigation brought by Members of Congress against the Executive Branch than in a suit by
other affected persons).
62. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
63. See Bush v. Gore (Bush II), 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (ending state-ordered recount
based on the Equal Protection Clause); Bush v. Palm Beach Co. Canvassing Bd. (Bush I), 531
U.S. 70 (2000) (vacating state court decision that had required a recount and remanding for
clarification).
64. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49–53 (2001).
65. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 278–79 (2002) (“[T]he
text of the Constitution vests authority with the state legislatures to select electors and with
Congress to count the votes and to select the President in the event that no candidate commands
a majority”; “[T]he text of Article II, Section 1 itself appears to give Congress the ability to
determine whether a state judiciary has overstepped its bounds and improperly interfered with
the state legislature’s authority under Article II to determine the manner in which electors are
chosen.”); see generally id. at 277–95. Professor Barkow does not argue that the Equal
Protection claim, which was the basis for the Bush II per curiam opinion, was foreclosed by
the political question doctrine. Id. at 276 n.212.
66. Id. at 275 (finding surprising the Court’s failure even to consider the political question
doctrine in Bush I, notwithstanding parties’ failure to raise it, and treating the decline of the
political question doctrine as reflective of a troubling tendency of the Court to believe itself
the only branch capable of resolving constitutional controversies).
67. See, e.g., Mark E. Warren & Jane Mansbridge with André Bächtiger et al.,
Deliberative Negotiation, in POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 141 (Jane Mansbridge &
Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2015); Gillian Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword:
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV L. REV. 1, 85–87 (2017)
(implying that the Constitution requires “effective governance”); see also N.W. BARBER, THE
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serve as a check on unwise or unconstitutional action, they were not intended as a
block to governance; indeed, the Framers were concerned to create a more functional,
more effective national government than had existed under the Articles of
Confederation. As Justice Robert Jackson once wrote about “[t]he actual art of
governing under our Constitution,” it “cannot conform to judicial definitions of the
power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government.”68
Arguments for expanded legislative standing based on the breakdown of
congressional processes may instead be indicative of reasons for caution in
entertaining novel theories of legislative standing.69 To elaborate: a court that devotes
much of its decisional authority to head-on conflict between the two elected branches
risks angering each in ways that over the long run may weaken support for the value
of judicial independence.70 This occurred in the first Russian Constitutional Court,71
although, given how well established our federal courts are, that danger (if it exists)
is one for the long run, not the short run.
Moreover, a major problem in the Congress—and in U.S. society—has been a
loss of commitment to the value of compromise.72 This loss of commitment to
compromise as a basic tool in representative democracy contributes substantially to
various pathologies in the national political process. Knowing that the Court will step
in to resolve disputes may be more likely to diminish than to enhance the willingness
of the legislative branch to engage in compromise. The ability to forge and enforce
compromises is an essential aspect of any democratic government in a complex
society. To the extent that the Court entertains jurisdiction to decide cases—even
cases raising real constitutional questions—that are essentially disputes between the
political branches, where no individual or entity outside those branches claims injury,
it may encourage irresponsibility and ideological posturing in the political branches,
rather than encouraging a spirit of compromise and working-it-out-edness.
To be sure, there are countervailing arguments. Perhaps we are at a pass where
judicial intervention has become essential to clarify the ground rules of the national

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming Aug. 2018) (arguing, in a chapter on
separation of powers, that the separation of powers in a state should ordinarily be structured
to promote cooperation between its different parts and that legislatures are needed for a state
to function successfully by testing expert opinion, setting broad policy and exercising
oversight of plans for implementing policy).
68. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). I am not related in any way to Justice Jackson.
69. Cf. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980)
(arguing that the federal judiciary should not adjudicate disputes over constitutional powers as
between Congress and the President, but should instead leave such issues to the political
process).
70. See supra note 61 (citing Souter concurrence in Raines for the point that direct
interbranch conflict poses more of a threat to the role of courts than privately initiated suits).
71. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 792–804.
72. See Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role
Obligations of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1717, 1765–67 (2016).
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political process in the midst of current disputes for the guidance of members of the
different branches.73 But to so conclude would mark a serious departure from existing
understandings, with risks to both courts and politics. The question of standing in
any particular dispute brought by members of one branch against another, this Essay
suggests, should be approached with an attitude of caution, mindful of both the ruleof-law values served in settling the issue but also of the potential risks in looking to
courts to provide such settlement. And, despite the many virtues of single factor or
rule-based theories, this Essay argues rather for a more nuanced approach based on
multiple factors, acknowledging both the importance of precedent and the
complexity of the factors that should be considered in resolving questions of
justiciability in the context of interbranch litigation.
Traditionally, what independent Article III courts have been most needed for has
been the protection of individuals from injury arising out of violations of rights or
structural parts of the Constitution.74 It is the rights and interests of persons or entities
outside of the political power centers of government that even well-functioning
majoritarian systems are likely at times to abuse or overlook. And it is for the
protection of those rights and interests that the Court should be most willing to press
political tolerances and spend its reservoirs of diffuse support. Indeed, individual
standing could, and perhaps should, be broadened to the end of making judicial
review more available where such individual rights and interests are at stake. As I
have elsewhere argued, some of the Court’s decisions denying individual standing to
challenge government action have been wrong and harmful, a form of self-restraint
that advances neither democratic self-government nor the respect for rights that a
well-functioning constitutional democracy requires.75 But resolving constitutional
conflicts of a partisan character between members of different branches, which those

73. Cf. Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV.
124, 134–41, 144–48 (2014) (arguing for expanding standing in cases involving pure public
law disputes, generally involving separation of powers issues, under a constitutional rule).
74. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)] lies in the protection it has afforded the
constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive
or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision
of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and
has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial
review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis
rests.”). Individuals’ rights and interests are protected not only by explicit rights provisions
but also by more structural elements of the Constitution. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
75. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 133 (2014). Even under existing doctrine, cases like
Richardson could well come out differently were Congress to enact legislation to implement
the Constitution’s Statement and Accounts Clause and authorize individuals to sue to obtain
information that they claim is required to be made public. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11
(1998); see also infra note 218 (noting Lyons and Spokeo as cases where the Court was too
narrow in defining individual standing).
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other branches are capable of resolving themselves and for which each has major
tools of power at their disposal, bears a higher set of risks to the constitutional system.
In this light, I now analyze several different kinds of claims that might be brought
by congressional plaintiffs, having in mind the benefits of not expanding
congressional standing too broadly while preserving the capacity of courts to help
secure constitutional rule of law.
III. LEGISLATIVE STANDING IN PARTICULAR SETTINGS
The concerns raised above do not apply themselves to particular categories of
claims for legislative standing. The following sections seek to do so, without
necessarily resolving close questions. Although reasonable arguments for
substantially expanding congressional standing exist, I urge a more cautious
approach to expanding congressional standing beyond existing parameters.
The Court’s formal doctrine for establishing standing has solidified around three
elements said to be derived from the Constitution: there must be a concrete injury
(not a generalized grievance), caused by or traceable to the conduct complained of,
and redressable by the judicial relief sought.76 In some cases, particular Members of
Congress can assert a personal injury of the kind clearly presenting a sufficiently
concrete and particularized injury for purposes of “standing,” as discussed in Part
III.A below. But most of the time the kinds of cases in which congressional actors
invoke the Article III courts’ jurisdiction involve claims of institutional injuries. In
cases involving the institutional interests of Members or parts of Congress, these
three constitutional components will not by themselves prove especially useful in
distinguishing among cases in which congressional parties invoke federal courts’
jurisdiction. More general separation of powers concerns, relying on the ability of
the other branches to resolve their disputes through political mechanisms, come into
play.
To begin with, a perfectly reasonable argument could be made for recognizing
legislative standing quite broadly. There is no conceptual difficulty in identifying
distinctive injuries for legislators, in their capacity as legislators, in cases involving
the constitutionality of federal laws or executive branch action: there is something
special about being an elected member of the legislative branch that, it can be argued,
distinguishes their claims of injury from those of the general public.77 Indeed, federal

76. E.g., Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Although the ban on
“generalized grievances” has sometimes been identified as a “prudential” (rather than
“constitutional”) factor, it has been used to help define the (constitutional) concrete injury
requirement. See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (“The only
injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been
followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the
conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”).
77. Moreover, there is a close relationship between how constitutional injury is defined
and the elements of redressability and causation; injuries to Members of Congress defined by
virtue of their special status in government could be crafted in such a way as to secure these
other elements. In Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman’s case (discussed infra note 78), for example, if
her injury were the loss of opportunity to vote on whether the war should continue, the
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courts in the early 1970s sometimes accepted such claims of standing—in at least
one case, by a single Member of Congress who was challenging the constitutionality
of the spread of the war in Vietnam into bombing of targets in Cambodia.78 Where
such an institutional injury is alleged, moreover, the claim is likely to meet causation
and redressability requirements, since the injury would be caused by the assertedly
unlawful conduct complained of and would be redressed by a judicial declaration of
invalidity, which the government would presumably honor.79 But the Court has been
skeptical of such claims of institutional injury, for reasons not unrelated to the
concerns for democracy and the federal courts’ role therein raised above.
In Raines v. Byrd,80 the Court distinguished between “personal” claims of injury,
such as those suffered by the plaintiff in Powell v McCormack,81 who alleged that

President’s failure to seek such a vote could be treated as the cause of the injury, and a judicial
declaration of rights indicating that she and other Members must vote to authorize hostilities
could be viewed as likely to redress the injury.
78. See Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (“Plaintiff qua
Congresswoman does not merely suffer in some indefinite way in common with people
generally. She is a member of a specific and narrowly defined group—the House of
Representatives. As a Congresswoman, plaintiff is called upon to appropriate funds for
military operations, raise an army, and declare war. Additionally, plaintiff has a continuing
responsibility to insure the checks and balances of our democracy through the use of
impeachment. When a plaintiff is a member of a narrowly defined group, which has been more
directly affected by the conduct in question than has the general population, the test for
standing should be met.”) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals reversed, on justiciablity
grounds. It found her claim barred by the political question doctrine, but did not exclude the
possible justiciability of other war-related claims involving “clear abuse amounting to bad
faith.” See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308–09, 1311–12 (2d Cir. 1973). It
quoted from Judge Wyzanski’s opinion in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir.
1973):
Even if the necessary facts were to be laid before it, a court would not substitute
its judgment for that of the President, who has an unusually wide measure of
discretion in this area, and who should not be judicially condemned except in a
case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Otherwise a court would be ignoring
the delicacies of diplomatic negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the best
solution of an international conflict, and the scope which in foreign affairs must
be allowed to the President if this country is to play a responsible role in the
council of the nations.
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d at 1311–12. The Court of Appeals also rejected Holtzman’s
standing (over Judge Oakes’ dissent): it found that she was not denied the right to vote or
debate; if her vote was ineffective, it was due to the contrary votes of her colleagues. See id.
at 1315. And her argument that a determination of illegality would be useful in any
impeachment proceedings, the court said, would require the federal courts to give an
essentially advisory opinion, prohibited by Article III. See id. (I was a legislative intern in Rep.
Holtzman’s office for part of the summer of 1973.)
79. But cf. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1992) (Scalia, J., for a
plurality) (suggesting that redressability would be defeated by the possibility that a federal
agency not a party to the litigation would not consider itself bound by a final judgment on an
issue of federal law).
80. 521 U.S. 811, 820–21 (1997).
81. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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Congress had wrongfully refused to seat him notwithstanding his election, and
“institutional” claims of injury to Members of Congress, which are considerably
more difficult to make out. As noted earlier, the Court in Raines rejected the standing
of several Members of Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, which, they
claimed, had the effect of unconstitutionally diminishing the power of their votes in
Congress; the mere enactment of the statute, the Court said, did not of itself effect
such a diminishment,82 and Congress had it within its grasp to rectify any use made
by Presidents of the purported authority to cancel spending programs.83 In light of
Raines, respect for precedent suggests that a narrower definition of injury would need
to be used in defining congressional standing than one premised on the special status
of Members of Congress as lawmakers or public representatives.84
The Court’s standing case law has been widely described and frequently critiqued
for inconsistency. As noted above, it would not be difficult to construct arguments
for expansive congressional standing. But all else being equal, theories of standing
that comport with the main thrust of prior cases are to be preferred to those that strike
out entirely anew, in light of what Dworkin called “fit,”85 and that others might see
as a kind of Burkean incrementalism.86 In light of such concerns for “fit” and
concerns not to undermine congressional capacities for using political mechanisms
to resolve disputes, a narrower compass of legislative standing should be drawn.
With this in mind, I propose below several factors to guide thinking about legislative
standing (beyond the arguably special injury suffered by Members of Congress
through asserted failures of federal officers to carry out or comply with the law and
in addition to the distinction between “personal” and “institutional” injury).
First, how have claims similar to the one at issue been dealt with in the past?
History cannot be dispositive, of course;87 standing itself was, according to many
scholars, only invented in the mid-twentieth century, and its parameters have shown
considerable flexibility in responding to and allowing new types of claims, for
example, of environmental harm. But a pattern of handling particular disputes
through political processes, as was discussed in Raines, is not irrelevant.

82. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 824–26.
83. Id.
84. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the judgment, finding
the issue of standing more “debatable” than did the majority, but concluding that general
separation of powers concerns supported finding the case nonjusticiable, as an interbranch and
intrabranch dispute intervention in which “would risk damaging the public confidence that is
vital to the functioning of the Judicial Branch by embroiling the federal courts in a power
contest nearly at the height of its political tension.” Id. at 830, 833 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment) (citation omitted).
85. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 67–68 (1986).
86. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 24; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH.
L. Rev. 353, 356 (2006); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political
Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
87. Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2538 (1998) (“[P]roperly to understand when particular remedies are constitutionally
required, one must distill somewhat broader remedial principles from our constitutional text,
structure, and tradition than can be drawn either from history or from a particular constitutional
clause.”).
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Second, is the claimed injury one that could be redressed by means available to
Congress, without resort to the courts, through oversight processes, control of
appropriations, or even by impeachment? In Raines v. Byrd, the Court emphasized
the many mechanisms that exist under the Constitution for Congress and its Members
to express disagreement with the Executive88: Congress may hold oversight hearings,
or withhold consideration of nominees, or impose constraints on the use of
appropriated funds.89 As others have noted, impeachment may also be available to
redress some forms of alleged Executive wrongdoing.90 The availability of effective
political tools secured by the Constitution’s allocations of powers may bear on
whether the claim should be viewed as justiciable.91
Third, are there likely to be individuals or entities outside of Congress that would
suffer concrete injury and could thus raise the challenge without putting the Court
directly into the position of having to reject either Congress’s or the Executive
Branch’s positions as party litigants? Even when a federal statute is challenged by
private persons, separation of powers concerns may inform the Court’s adjudication
of the constitutionality of the action of another branch.92 But where the parties to the
litigation are themselves parts of the two other branches, the constitutional stakes are
inevitably heightened, and the risks to the courts that much greater.93 To be sure, the
Court has not always been hospitable to the proposition—in cases brought by citizens
or taxpayers—that the absence of other parties with standing should count in any way

88. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 819–20, 826–29.
89. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219,
1229 (1993).
90. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress can use powers, like impeachment, if it disagrees with Executive enforcement
decisions). Some suggest that impeachment is always available as a tool in disputes between
Congress and the President and thus that reliance on its availability as an alternative remedy
would always defeat congressional standing to challenge executive action. See, e.g., Jonathan
Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 363
(2015). But history suggests that enough Members of Congress to make a difference would
take seriously the substantive constitutional limitations on impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 4 (limiting impeachment and removal from office to “Treason, Bribery, and other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors”); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO L.J. 2193, 2219–20 (1998)
(arguing that impeachable acts are not simply whatever will motivate a partisan vote but
involve serious misconduct in breach of the public trust).
91. See supra text accompanying note 36.
92. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–61 (1984).
93. See supra note 84; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 833–34 (Souter, J. concurring in the
judgment) (noting that although “a suit challenging the constitutionality of this Act brought
by a party from outside the Federal Government would also involve the Court in resolving the
dispute over the allocation of power between the political branches, it would expose the
Judicial Branch to a lesser risk” than a suit brought by Members of Congress against the
Executive Branch, because “[d]eciding a suit to vindicate an interest outside the Government
raises no specter of judicial readiness to enlist on one side of a political tug-of-war, since ‘the
propriety of such action by a federal court has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803)’”); see also Nash, supra note 90, at 388 (arguing that likelihood of private
party standing on a claim would be prudential reason to deny standing to a congressional
plaintiff).
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towards recognizing the plaintiffs’ standing.94 However, in Raines the Court noted
that its decision did not “foreclose[] . . . constitutional challenge” by another plaintiff
as a factor that supported its conclusion that the congressional plaintiffs lacked
standing.95 The Court’s language—that its decision did not “foreclose” adjudication
of the constitutional validity of the statute with a proper party plaintiff—suggests
that the rule-of-law function played by judicial resolution of the issue could someday
be achieved.
Fourth, has the Congress as a whole through legislation, or the appropriate house
or committee by resolution, properly authorized the litigation?96 The Court has noted
the presence or absence of authorization to sue as bearing on legislative standing, in
both cases involving state legislators and Members of Congress.97 In Raines, the
Court specifically noted and thus presumably attached significance to the fact that
plaintiffs had “not been authorized to represent their respective Houses,”98 even
though the legislation in question had authorized any member of the Congress to
bring an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act.99 Authorization for
individual Members of Congress to sue was not enough to overcome what the Court
viewed as an absence of the kind of concrete, specific institutional injury needed to
sustain standing. Moreover, the Court has not hesitated to find that the standing of
congressional committees to bring actions was defeated where the resolution on
which the committee relied did not sufficiently clearly authorize it to bring suit.100

94. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
(“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is
not a reason to find standing.”). The Court rejected standing by citizens, or taxpayers, to
challenge Members of Congress retaining their membership in the Armed Forces Reserve as
a violation of Article I, section 6, which provides that “no Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” It is
also possible that the issue would be deemed a “political question” committed to each house
to decide whether to expel a member.
95. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829; see also id. at 834 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
96. Cf., e.g., Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632,
1647–52 (1977) (distinguishing suits brought by individual Members of Congress for alleged
institutional injuries from suits brought by the entire Congress).
97. In addition to Raines, discussed below, see Ariz. Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,
2667 (2013) (refusing to accept the conclusion of the state court concerning the authority of
referendum proponents to defend the constitutionality of a law enacted by referendum, because
those proponents were not state officials subject to the control of the state in the ordinary
course); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“We have
recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute
unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.”) (citing
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987)); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. at 82 (indicating that a
state may designate the speaker of its legislature to defend the constitutionality of a law that
the executive branch of the state will not defend).
98. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829; see also id. at n.10.
99. Id. at 815–16.
100. See Reed v. Cty. Comm’rs of Del. Cty., 277 U.S. 376 (1928) (finding that the Senate
resolutions relied upon were inadequate to authorize Senate committee members to resort to
litigation to obtain certain records concerning a contested election). Although the Constitution

2018]

CONGRESSIONAL STANDING TO SUE

865

Relatedly, to the extent that the claim involves an alleged denial of the right of
Members of Congress to vote, it may be relevant whether enough Members of
Congress, from the appropriate chamber(s), have joined in the litigation to suggest
that a vote might change the status quo,101 indicating that the dispute has the kind of
immediacy of real consequences sometimes captured by prudential elements of
justiciability law.102 As a logical matter, if the injury is to a right to vote, that injury
is cured by the opportunity to vote regardless of the outcome; but in the more
pragmatic approach sometimes taken by courts to issues of standing, courts may be
more inclined to intervene in ongoing political disputes if judicial intervention may
really make a difference in more than an abstract way.
Finally, as Professor Fallon has recently said, “whether a plaintiff has suffered a
judicially cognizable injury—and, if so, whether the relief sought is sufficiently
likely to redress it to support standing—frequently turns on the provision of law
under which a plaintiff seeks relief.”103 Here, I suggest that it will matter whether the
claim itself is one that has a sufficient specificity that it can be distinguished from
claims that would allow congressional standing with respect to any public dispute.
As will be discussed below, Legislative Vesting Clause or Take Care Clause claims,
or claims based on asserted violations of appropriations legislation, arguably lack—
except perhaps in very narrow circumstances—the specificity that would enable
courts to confine legislative standing to narrow, discrete areas.
Each of these factors is not necessarily relevant to every claim of legislator or
legislative standing, and some of the factors may overlap. But together they can work
to afford courts needed analytical tools in an area that is difficult because the

gives each house of Congress the authority to make its own rules, where the rights of those
outside a house are placed at stake in litigation, the interpretation of those rules—including
what they authorize—becomes a matter for judicial determination. See United States v. Smith,
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
101. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 823 (characterizing Coleman v. Miller as depending,
inter alia, on the presence as party litigants of “legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act”); Nash, supra note 90, at 376–77
(suggesting that requiring formal authorization by a house is inconsistent with vindicating
constitutional congressional interest under special supermajority constitutional voting rules);
Note, supra note 30, at 1756–57 (criticizing Raines’ possible requirement of a house resolution
authorizing litigation as applied, for example, to supermajority voting rules for adopting
treaties).
102. One other issue is worth noting here: it is possible that, in light of INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), both houses of Congress would need to join in litigation, the purpose and
effect of which was to change the legal status or obligations of persons outside the Congress.
See Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power To Represent Itself in
Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 603–14 (2014) (arguing that the presumption of bicameralism
would preclude a single house from asserting a grievance with respect to failure to carry out,
enforce, or defend an enacted law); Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing
Jurisdiction at 15–17, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307) (arguing
that a single house acting alone may lack authority to assert an injury belonging to Congress
as a whole).
103. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1071
(2015); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 232–47
(1988).
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distinctive status of being an elected member of the legislature might plausibly
support very broad claims of standing. Bearing these factors in mind, how, then,
should claims of standing in various areas be analyzed? I begin with what seem to
be relatively easy cases.
A. Standing to Contest Entitlement to an Office
An individual legislator’s standing to contest entitlement to his or her office
appears well settled. It was not even mentioned as a disputed issue in Powell v.
McCormack (1969), where the Court found justiciable Adam Clayton Powell’s suit
challenging the House of Representatives refusal to seat him.104 Had Powell lacked
standing, it is inconceivable that the Court would not have discussed that issue, in a
case where vigorous arguments about justiciability, revolving around the “political
question” doctrine, were discussed at length. In principle, questions of a legislator’s
entitlement to take his or her seat involves an individual right that also coincides with
the democratic rights of those who, it is asserted, elected the legislator. And it is clear
that the legislator denied his or her seat has a special and quite concrete injury that is
not widely shared. Moreover, these claims involve an intrabranch contest within
Congress, not involving the President; in hearing such disputes courts are thus taking
on only one of the two political branches. Legislators’ standing to contest their
exclusion from office thus stands on firm foundations of precedent, constitutional
purposes, and concern for consequences.105
B. Actions to Enforce Subpoenas
The power of each house of Congress to conduct investigations, including
issuance of subpoenas, has been established since at least the early part of the
twentieth century as ancillary to Congress’s lawmaking functions.106 Although

104. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court found the question justiciable, rejecting the argument
that it was nonjusticiable, for reasons primarily focused on the political question doctrine. See
id. at 516–49. It concluded that Powell had been unconstitutionally excluded, because the only
grounds on which a member could be excluded were failure to meet the standing qualifications
provided by the Constitution—age, citizenship, and residency. See id. at 489, 550.
105. Other claims relating to the apportionment of seats, as in the conduct of the U.S.
Census, might stand on similar ground, although the connection is somewhat more attenuated;
the Supreme Court did not reach the question of congressional standing in its decision on
census methodology, Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
328–30 (1999), though the standing of the House was upheld in the three-judge court below.
See U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C.
1998) (upholding standing on informational injury grounds and on grounds that the current
House had a concrete and strong interest in its own future composition and in preventing
political manipulation). I do not address in this Essay other kinds of claims by some Members
of Congress that internal rules or decisions have inequitably reduced their voting power. See,
e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Like the issue in Powell, such claims involve intrabranch, rather than
interbranch, conflict; in such conflicts, some political methods of redress (e.g., oversight
hearings, funding bans), available in interbranch disputes, would be unavailable.
106. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); see also Anderson v. Dunn,
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Congress has other means to enforce its subpoenas—including imprisoning
subpoenaed witnesses who must then seek release through habeas corpus107—
recognizing the standing of committees or houses of Congress to seek judicial
assistance in enforcing subpoenas is supported by a fairly long historical pedigree,
dating back at least to the 1920s, when the Senate adopted its 1928 Standing Order
authorizing Senate committees to bring civil actions to, inter alia, enforce
subpoenas.108

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225–29 (1821); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per
curiam) (noting Congress’s investigatory powers).
107. See, e.g., Barry v. U.S. ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619–20 (1929); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 160, 174 (“[T]he power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”); see also TODD GARVEY &
ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34114, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: A SKETCH (2014) [hereinafter GARVEY &
DOLAN, A SKETCH]. According to Garvey and Dolan, three mechanisms exist for vindication
of this subpoena power: “inherent contempt power,” as was used in the nineteenth century,
under which the house that subpoenaed a witness could bring contempt charges against the
witness, hold an abbreviated trial, and imprison for contempt until the subpoena was complied
with; referral of the case to the U.S. Attorney for a criminal contempt prosecution that was,
unlike civil contempt, not curable by compliance; or bringing a civil enforcement proceeding
in a court to compel the witness to produce. Id. at 1. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
181–90 (1881), suggested that punishment for contempt was a judicial function, beyond the
power of Congress, but found it unnecessary to so hold, resting instead on the proposition that
“no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire,” which
jurisdiction was lacking, id. at 190. Kilbourn was interpreted in McGrain as resting on the lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the inquiry. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 170–
71. The McGrain Court upheld the authority of the Senate to require witnesses to attend
legislative hearings and to hold the witness in contempt. See id. at 180 (finding the witness to
have wrongfully refused to appear and to have been lawfully “attached,” and concluding that
the district court “erred in discharging him from custody”).
108. See S. JOURNAL, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1928) (reflecting approval of S. RES. 262,
70th Cong. (1928)); see also GARVEY & DOLAN, A SKETCH, supra note 107, at 11 n.78. Since
1978, the Senate has had explicit statutory authority to bring civil enforcement actions in
courts, of which several have been pursued. According to another research paper by Garvey
and Dolan, on at least six occasions between 1979 and 1995 the Senate authorized litigation
to enforce a subpoena. See TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL
SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 25 (2014) [hereinafter GARVEY &
DOLAN, LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE].
On the House side, there do not appear to be either standing orders or statutory
authority, although the standing of the House or its committees to sue to enforce subpoenas,
of both private entities and the Executive Branch, has been upheld in the lower courts. See
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64–65 (D.D.C. 2008);
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2013). A later
decision in the Holder case is pending appeal. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S.
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The standing of legislative bodies to enforce congressional subpoenas through
judicial action poses relatively small risks to the overall separation of powers
scheme, although other justiciability (or other constitutional) barriers to enforcing
such subpoenas against executive branch officials may exist.109 Moreover,
recognizing congressional standing here has the benefit of providing an independent
judicial forum in which the persons who receive such subpoenas, even if they are
government officials, can advance and protect their own asserted rights not to testify
or produce information.110 It is thus consistent with the role of the federal courts to
protect individual rights from abusive government conduct.
C. Claims Relating to Special Prerogatives to Vote in Congress
This next group of cases is more difficult. They involve contexts in which
congressional actors might claim that their votes were “completely nullified,”
drawing on the Supreme Court’s case law involving state legislatures,111 or that they
have been denied any opportunity to vote on a matter on which their vote is required.
With limited exceptions, discussed first below, they lack historic precedent for the
justiciability of their claims; other relevant factors may vary across contexts.

House of Representatives v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101 (2016); see GARVEY & DOLAN, LAW,
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE, supra at 30, 35–37 (noting U.S. Department of Justice’s
justiciability objections to efforts by Congress to enforce subpoenas against Executive Branch
officers); cf. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53. The district court in Miers had denied the
government’s motion to dismiss the action to compel the President’s White House Counsel to
provide evidence, id. at 65–78 (rejecting argument that the House committee lacked standing),
id. at 78–99 (rejecting other grounds for dismissal); it was, according to Irv Nathan, the first
time the House had successfully sued the Executive Branch to enforce subpoenas of testimony
that the White House was trying to protect. See Irvin B. Nathan, Opinion, A Dangerous
Obamacare Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/appeal-house-v-burwell/2015/10/04/d8eec2d6-693f-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html?
utm_term-.f9229965eb75 [https://perma.cc/F6YV-4Z6N].
109. See GARVEY & DOLAN, A SKETCH, supra note 107, at 13–15, 14 n.94.
110. On the possibility of Congress using its “long dormant inherent contempt power” or
making a referral to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, or instead using civil
enforcement actions, see GARVEY & DOLAN, LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 108, at 1–2. On the importance of the courts’ role in protecting individual rights in
resolving justiciability questions, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring). But cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1990)
(rejecting the argument that it is more important for the Court to adjudicate claimed violations
of individual rights provisions than of structural provisions, and finding justiciable a challenge
to a statute claimed to have been enacted in violation of the Origination Clause). In MunozFlores, however, it is important to note that it was an individual challenging the validity of a
statute under which he was prosecuted, asserting his liberty interest in not being prosecuted
under an invalid statute. See id. at 394.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33, 39–41 (discussing Coleman v. Miller and
Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Districting Commission); see also infra notes 135, 186
(discussing Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case law on legislator standing).
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1. INS v. Chadha: Standing to Defend Statutes’ Constitutionality or to Give Effect
to a Congressional Vote?
Consider INS v. Chadha,112 involving the constitutionality of a statutory
legislative veto provision at the federal level. Congress enacted legislation providing
that the Attorney General could suspend deportation for certain otherwise deportable
aliens, provided that the Attorney General notify Congress of such suspensions and
further provided that either house of Congress could, by resolution of that house,
countermand the Attorney General’s decision and return the alien to deportable
status. The House of Representatives so voted for six individuals, including
Chadha.113 On Chadha’s appeal from an INS decision implementing that vote, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the legislative veto unconstitutional.114
The U.S. government agreed, but took an appeal; both houses of Congress had
intervened and also filed notices of appeal.115
The Supreme Court rejected justiciability challenges, concluding first “that the
INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from
taking action it would otherwise take” that the government was a proper party to take
the appeal.116 It discussed the presence of the two houses of Congress to show that
the controversy was presented in sufficiently adverse form. The Court ended this
discussion by stating “[w]e have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend
the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with
enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or
unconstitutional.”117 To the extent the Court meant to refer to a party proper, as
opposed to an amicus curiae, this statement was incorrect. The Court cited two cases
in support; one of the two cited cases was completely inapposite, and the other
involved a house of Congress arguing as an amicus.118
Although this dictum is cited in support of the proposition that Congress has
standing to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the Justice Department
declines to defend it,119 the circumstances of Chadha were far narrower than this
dictum suggests. The substantive issue involved Congress’s defense of a statutory
voting prerogative of one of its houses, acting alone, to prevent a deportation.120 If

112. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
113. Id. at 926–27.
114. See id. at 928.
115. See id. at 930 & n.5.
116. Id. at 930.
117. Id. at 940.
118. The Court cited only two cases in support. The first, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392
U.S. 206 (1968), has nothing to do with the issue. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946), Congress appeared as an amicus, defending the constitutionality of a statute that both
the Executive and the plaintiffs agreed was unconstitutional. See id. at 304, 306. For
discussion, see Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction, supra note
102, at 8–15; Grove, supra note 21, at 1360–61.
119. See, e.g., Brief on Jurisdiction for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
of the U.S. House of Representatives at 16, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
120. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923–28.
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the one-house “veto” cancelling the suspension of Chadha’s deportation was treated
as invalid, the vote of the House would arguably be “completely nullified,” in accord
with the Court’s case law on legislative standing of state legislatures.121 Indeed, as
Justice Scalia noted in his Windsor dissent, in Chadha “the House and Senate were
threatened with destruction of what they claimed to be one of their institutional
powers.”122
Some scholars and jurists have argued that Congress should have standing to
defend the constitutionality of statutes not defended by the Executive Branch.123
Although the Court’s dictum in Chadha could be read to support this proposition
(and the Court has indicated its support for allowing state legislative leaders standing
to defend the constitutionality of state laws when state law authorizes them to do
so),124 Professor Tara Grove has argued that at the federal level the Take Care clause
vests litigation authority to defend or not to defend the constitutionality of federal
law only in the Executive Branch.125 Moreover, she points out the presence within

121. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2665–66 (2015); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
122. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. E.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent
Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1247–50 (2012); Abner Greene, Interpretive
Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But Not-Defend Problem,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582–98 (2012); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 914 (2012) (arguing more generally that Congress should participate as a party in more
litigation, statutory and constitutional); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives
had standing to defend the constitutionality of DOMA).
124. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987). In this case, involving the constitutionality
of a moment of silence law, state law authorized the leaders of the state assembly and the upper
house of the state legislature to represent the state in litigation. Id. at 81–82. In this context,
the Court explained in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, “[w]e have recognized that
state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.” 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). In
Karcher, the appeal was dismissed because former heads were no longer in office, but the
judgment below was not vacated because the state legislature could have but chose not to
appeal. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 81–83. In Arizonans for Official English, the Court did not decide
any issue of legislative standing, finding the case moot, though it expressed “grave doubts”
that the organizers of the initiative to place the provisions of the challenged law on a
referendum ballot had standing to defend the constitutionality of the enacted law. 520 U.S. at
66.
125. See Grove, supra note 21, at 1312, 1353–61 (arguing that although the “Take Care”
clause confers authority on the President to enforce and defend federal laws, Article I confers
no such power on Congress and thus Congress and its subparts lack standing to do so); see
also Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 624 (noting Supreme Court decisions holding that
“[t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws”) (quoting
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)). For an argument that the Constitution does not
create a cause of action for legislators to challenge the way laws are being implemented, see
John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. & POL.
103 (2015) (arguing that the Constitution creates an interest for legislators in the validity of
enactments, not in how they are implemented, because the “legislative power” is a power to
create, but not to execute, laws).
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the executive branch and the absence within Congress of procedures to provide
consistency on litigation positions, which may be of great importance to the
individuals whose interests are at stake.126 Congressional participation as an amicus,
she argues, is the method historically used, one that does not pose the threat of
Congress’s litigation decisions affecting individual rights.127 As she and Neal Devins
point out, allowing Congress or parts thereof to have intervenor status enables them
to pick and choose what cases to appeal, a form of “prosecutorial discretion” at least
arguably committed to the Executive Branch and posing genuine risks of
inconsistency in the treatment of individuals.128
These arguments against any broad approach to congressional standing to defend
the constitutionality of statutes are supported by numerous Supreme Court decisions
on the separation of powers, the thrust of which is that Congress cannot directly
control the execution of the laws it enacts but is limited to efforts to influence the
Executive Branch through oversight or to change the law through new substantive or
appropriations statutes.129 Bringing a lawsuit or appealing from a judgment that the

126. Grove, supra note 21, at 1328. If the argument were accepted that Congress should
have standing to defend the unconstitutionality of a law not being defended or enforced by the
Executive, such a lawsuit might raise other Article III problems. Where the Executive is
enforcing, but not defending, the statute, the Executive presumably would be bound by the
judgment, and courts can secure an adequate defense of the statute’s constitutionality through
amicus participation. Where the Executive is not enforcing the law, the legislature could not
simply intervene in an ongoing lawsuit but would need to initiate one against the Executive.
But actions to compel the government to enforce the law against third parties are difficult even
for private parties to establish standing to bring. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973) (suggesting that the executive branch—even of state government—cannot be
compelled to bring a prosecution against a third party). But cf., e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding jurisdiction to compel agency to act on the basis that it had
made mistake of law in concluding it did not need to promulgate regulations). Moreover,
having Congress or a house of Congress on one side of the litigation as a party litigant might
present unusual challenges to the ability of a court to enforce its litigation-related orders or to
grant relief on counterclaims. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (imposing
limitations on lower courts’ power to sanction individual members of a city council for the
city’s noncompliance with a consent decree); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing Members of
Congress certain immunities from judicial process for their legislative activities). Similar
problems would arise in actions such as those to enforce a subpoena, but as the range of issues
broadens, so too do the range of remedial complications and counterclaims that might be raised
by a defendant.
127. See Grove, supra note 21, at 1362.
128. Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 626–27.
129. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 269–70 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 732; INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 954 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126–27 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that
Congress may engage in investigation but not in rulemaking or directly appointing persons to
execute the laws, including to litigate about them). For a Court of Appeals decision rejecting
the Senate’s standing, under a federal statute authorizing the Senate to intervene to defend the
constitutionality of federal statutes, see Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.
2002) (distinguishing Chadha and other cases of congressional intervention as being “of a
character that directly (particularly) implicated the authority of Congress within our scheme
of government, and the scope and reach of its ability to allocate power among the three
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Executive Branch has decided not to appeal would seem to be matters directly
involving the execution of the laws and, however desirable such interventions might
be in litigation among the branches of the state governments, would run up against a
relatively thick set of judicial precedents insisting on a separation of those functions
at the national level.130
Chadha could be understood more narrowly to involve standing to assert a
specific legislative prerogative to vote under a federal statute. The presence of such
a specific, concrete interest would provide a usable limiting principle to distinguish
Chadha from other cases, where congressional actors may seek to intervene to defend
the constitutionality of a federal statute, as in Windsor.131 And Coleman v. Miller,132
a case coming out of the state courts, and its progeny would support a narrow
“complete nullification” basis for congressional standing, although—as the Court
recently noted in the Arizona Legislature case—separation of powers concerns exist
with Congress invoking federal courts jurisdiction to challenge executive action that
do not arise when state legislatures sue state officials.133
Even under such a limiting “complete nullification” principle, there are several
classes of cases plausibly involving allegations that congressional actors were
deprived of a right to vote or that a vote already taken by or in Congress has been
“completely nullified,”134 including issues about pocket vetoes, treaties, wars,
confirmations, and foreign emoluments.135 Each has distinctive histories, purposes,
and contexts, as discussed further below.

branches”). Other aspects of the case, including the standing of the father who challenged the
constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance’s reference to God, and the federal courts’
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief directed against either the President or the Congress, were
addressed in other opinions. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002),
amended on reh’g by 328 F.3d 466, 484–90 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (finding that the father-plaintiff lacked prudential
standing).
130. But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a House committee had standing to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a
federal statute being enforced but not defended by the Executive Branch). Justice Scalia,
joined by two others, disagreed. See id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority did
not reach the question.
131. See above note * (describing the author’s prior involvement as Court-appointed amica
curiae in Windsor).
132. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
133. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2664–66, 2265 n.12 (2015).
134. See id. at 2665–66; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).
135. Private persons have been allowed to raise Origination Clause claims—that is, claims
that a statute adversely affecting them was a revenue for raising taxes that should have, but
did not, originate in the House. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). In a
pre-Raines v. Byrd decision, the D.C. Circuit held that nineteen members of the House had
standing to raise an Origination Clause claim against the constitutionality of a tax law. See
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that
plaintiffs “allege[d] a specific injury in fact to a cognizable legal interest: the deprivation of
an opportunity to debate and vote on the origination of TEFRA in the House” before it was
considered in the Senate, observing that “[d]eprivation of a constitutionally mandated process
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2. On Pocket Vetoes
In Kennedy v. Sampson,136 the D.C. Circuit in 1974 upheld the standing of
Senator Kennedy, filing on his own and without authorization from the Senate, to
challenge the President’s claim that he had vetoed a bill enacted by Congress; in
Senator Kennedy’s view, the purported pocket veto was ineffective. Whether the
President can “pocket veto” a bill depends on whether Congress was in session to
receive the veto message; only if it is not does the President’s failure to sign a bill
within ten days of its being presented to him effectively veto the law. In this case,
the President took the position that he had successfully pocket vetoed a law; Senator
Kennedy argued that Congress had arranged to receive veto messages and that the
bill had accordingly become law without the President’s signature on the tenth day
after presentation.137 The D.C. Circuit at the time concluded that the Senator had
standing because his allegations, if correct on the merits, nullified his vote in support
of the bill and injured him as a legislator.138
After Raines v. Byrd cast some doubt on theories of individual legislator standing,
the D.C. Circuit in Chenoweth v. Clinton139 suggested that legislative standing in a
case like Kennedy v. Sampson to challenge whether a law had been vetoed might still
be sustained on a complete nullification theory: “Because it was the President’s
veto—not a lack of legislative support—that prevented the bill from becoming law .
. . those in the majority could plausibly describe the President’s action as a complete
nullification of their votes.”140 Uncertainty exists, however, in light of Raines’s
suggestion that in cases of institutional injury, an action might need to be authorized
by and on behalf of an entire house,141 and perhaps especially if the challenge is one
that might also be brought by a private person who could try to claim injury from

of enacting law may inflict a more specific injury on a member of Congress than would be
presented by a generalized complaint that a legislator's effectiveness is diminished by
allegedly illegal activities taking place outside the legislative forum”). Nonetheless the Moore
court refused to adjudicate the complaint on separation-of-powers informed equitable grounds
because the plaintiffs could obtain relief by persuading other Members of Congress to their
views and because private persons would have standing to challenge. Id. at 954–56.
Chenoweth, decided after Raines, implies that Moore’s reasoning on standing was too broad.
See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
136. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In The Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis (or San Poil),
Nespelem, Colville & Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of the State of Washington v. United States
(The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S. 655 (1929), although Congress and the President took a
different view of whether the President had successfully “pocket vetoed” the law in question,
neither part of Congress appeared as a party; “Representative Hatton Sumners appeared as
amicus curiae only on behalf of the House Judiciary Committee.” Grove & Devins, supra note
102, at 588.
137. See Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432.
138. See id., at 433–35 (rejecting argument that only the Congress as a whole, or one of its
houses, had standing, because the Senator’s interest, while “derivative” of his membership in
the body, is nonetheless substantial).
139. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 117.
141. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
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nonenforcement of the law.142 However, unlike the issue in Raines v. Byrd, where
the question of harm to legislator authority was contingent, and unlike issues that can
be raised under the Take Care, Legislative Vesting, or Appropriations Clauses
(discussed below), challenges to an executive claim of having vetoed a law, or of a
law not having obtained sufficient votes to be inscribed as a public law of the United
States, are far more discrete and confined. Standing in cases like Senator Kennedy’s
challenge thus remains possible, but uncertain; were a house of Congress to authorize
litigation in such a context—where the President and Congress disagree over the
effect of a congressional vote in favor of a proposed law—the case for legislative
standing would be stronger. With respect to concerns raised earlier about expansive
approaches to congressional standings, such situations will be rare, not common. And
where there is uncertainty over whether something is enacted law, rule of law
considerations might favor—rather than disfavor—rapid resolution of the
controversy, a factor that might support legislative standing.
3. Treaties
In Goldwater v. Carter,143 eight Senators challenged the President’s authority
unilaterally to terminate a treaty without some form of congressional consent. The
Supreme Court did not resolve whether the Senators had standing to raise the claim:
four members thought the issue was a nonjusticiable political question, and a fifth
believed that the controversy was not yet ripe because the Senate had not taken a
final position in opposition to the President.144 The claim of injury was
conceptualized as a procedural right to vote before the action is taken, and if the
substantive claim were correct then arguably there was such a procedural injury.145

142. Cf. id. (noting that the decision does not foreclose a “constitutional challenge (by
someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act)”). Some nonenforcement claims are more difficult to establish standing for. See infra note 207.
143. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The case was brought by eight Senators, along with sixteen
Members of the House and a former Senator. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950
(D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996.
144. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the complaint should be dismissed as not ripe for judicial review); id. at 1002
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment and joined by three other Justices) (arguing that the
case is nonjusticiable because it presents a political question).
145. A procedural claim of a right to vote might, in theory, be accepted as a form of
concrete injury—caused by a failure to vote and redressable by an opportunity to vote,
regardless of outcome. But the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, interpreting the Supreme Court’s
decision in Raines v. Byrd, suggests that standing would be lacking on such a procedural theory
without some reason to believe that either the Senate as a whole, or at least enough individual
senators to prevent the unmaking of the treaty, were joined or represented as plaintiffs. See
supra text accompanying note 33; see also infra note 186. (It is uncertain whether, in
Goldwater, if (for example) a two-thirds Senate vote were required to terminate a treaty, thirtyfour Senators would have had standing (or if a majority vote were required and one assumes
a filibuster rule, whatever minority was required to overcome a filibuster would have had
standing).) In an arguably analogous case involving the claim that Congress had the right to
condition the President’s termination of an employee on Senate consent, Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), a Member of the Senate was appointed only “as a friend of the
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But under Raines v. Byrd the Court might well insist on something more than
individual members acting separately—perhaps on a group large enough to be likely
to be able to block approval (if approval were substantively required). Only if the
group were large enough to block (which the group of eight Senator plaintiffs was
not), but not large enough to enact prohibitory legislation, might there be a situation
with no other form of redress available,146 especially if the treaty did not confer the
kind of individual benefits that would give rise to standing by those outside the
government. Although these factors would support standing for the Senate itself (or
conceivably for a large enough group of Senators who could defeat a vote), a claim
of injury because no vote at all was held might be viewed as a step removed from the
kind of nullification involved in Coleman v. Miller, Chadha, or the lower court
pocket veto cases—though not unlike the claim in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Districting Commission.
Another kind of claim, unsuccessfully advanced recently by Senator Ron Paul in
Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury,147 is that an intergovernmental agreement
was really a treaty, requiring the concurrence of the Senate. Crawford was an action
to enjoin enforcement of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which requires
various measures to get more information about foreign banking by U.S. citizens to
the IRS.148 Senator Paul’s claim for standing was rejected by the district court, which
reasoned that under Raines v. Byrd, the asserted institutional injury to the Senate’s
institutional interests was not sufficient for standing, at least where Senator Paul was
litigating without authorization from the Senate as a body.149
Given the availability of other ways to challenge action based on executive
agreements claimed to have needed Senate approval before they could function as
law, the possibility of private party standing, and the sheer number of executive
agreements that are reached, individual legislator standing should generally be
rejected. Even if the Senate were to authorize litigation, the risks of erroneous,
intrusive, or ill-timed judicial decisions seem much higher in this area in which much
will depend on executive practice in reaching agreements with foreign nations.150
Finally, permitting legislative standing on these issues will not necessarily involve
only a relatively rare and discrete question about the legal significance of an

Court,” id. at 176, to argue in support of the constitutionality of a federal statute that the
Executive Branch argued was unconstitutional. But the Senate did not participate as a party,
nor was such participation necessary for the Court to decide the issue in the case brought by
Myers, who clearly suffered an Article III injury.
146. See supra note 101; cf. supra note 135 (describing Moore’s refusal to adjudicate).
147. No. 3:15-cv-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015).
148. Id.
149. See id. at *6.
150. It has been suggested that the interests of foreign nations in knowing the legal status
of their agreements with the United States, and the uncertainties that may surround the
domestic legality of particular executive agreements, might support expanded congressional
standing. Given the President’s authority to seek legal opinions from his cabinet, as well as
the possibility of nongovernmental entities having standing, those interests would not
ordinarily provide a sufficient reason to jettison the cautionary approach urged in this Essay.
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acknowledged congressional vote; there were reportedly 5491 executive agreements
executed from 1990 to 2012 alone.151
4. Confirmations and Recess Appointments
Professor Jamal Greene has recently suggested that standing requirements should
be relaxed to allow Congress or its houses to bring actions to challenge Executive
Branch positions, like those at issue in NLRB v. Noel Canning,152 involving clear
constitutional rules whose application would later be justiciable in some form.153
Professor Greene argues that it is costly to allow uncertainty over the validity of an
appointment to linger until raised by a private party and adjudicated, with ensuing
disruption as other judgments of the same body might be at issue.154 A claim by
Senators that the President acted in violation of the recess appointment provisions
might be framed as one involving injury to the Senate’s right to vote on
appointments.
Justiciability doctrines, to be sure, can cause delay in resolving a constitutional
issue, requiring courts to wait until an individual is adversely affected. Such delay is
sometimes thought to have the benefit of allowing distance from the passions of the
moment (partisan or otherwise), as well as an accumulation of experience before the
finality of constitutional adjudication. Indeed, the Court in Raines v. Byrd said, given
“time-honored concern[s] about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper
constitutional sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the
merits of this important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and
efficiency.”155 On the other hand, delay in responding to obvious unconstitutionality
wreaks its own form of stress on constitutional democracies.
In Myers v. United States,156 the issue was the constitutionality of a statutory
provision requiring the Senate’s consent to removal of an executive branch officer.
The officer was removed, and challenged the President’s act of removal as
inconsistent with the statute, thereby raising the constitutional issue. A member of
the Senate was heard “as a friend of the Court,”157 but did not participate as a party.
In United States v. Smith,158 some eight years later, the Attorney General
authorized the bringing of an action in the name of the United States at the behest of
the Senate, to raise an asserted power of the Senate to withdraw confirmation of an
executive branch officer who had already received his commission. The Senate had
initially confirmed the nominee and then, on receipt of additional information, had

151. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1210 (2018) (Table 1); see also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S.
LAW 3 (2010) (indicating some 16,500 executive agreements were concluded by the United
States between 1939 and 2009).
152. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
153. Greene, supra note 73, at 142–52.
154. See id.
155. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
156. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
157. Id. at 176.
158. 286 U.S. 6, 29–30 (1932).
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voted to withdraw the confirmation.159 The Senate’s argument that it had power to
do so was rejected. Whether this should be regarded as an instance of congressional
standing is uncertain, as the action was brought in the name of the United States and
only with the permission of the Attorney General.160 And in any event, it involved a
completed vote, the effect of which was arguably “completely nullified” by the
President’s refusal to withdraw the nomination or terminate the officer, who had
already received his commission, emphasizing what a narrow proposition the case
stands for if it is read as a congressional standing case.
Precedent, thus, suggests that claims about whether officers have been duly
appointed or removed come within the Article III courts’ jurisdiction when they are
raised by the affected individual, as in Myers; when the authority of the officer is
challenged by persons adversely affected by the officer’s action, as in Noel Canning;
or possibly when both the executive and legislative branches agree to submit the
issue through something in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding to test the
legality of an office holder’s appointment, as in Smith.
Another kind of case would involve a claim that a seemingly duly appointed
officeholder was nonetheless barred from office for some constitutional or statutory
reason. In Ex parte Levitt,161 a citizen and member of the Supreme Court bar
challenged the validity of former Senator Hugo Black’s Supreme Court appointment,
on the grounds, inter alia, that he had been in the Senate when retirement benefits for
federal judges were increased and was thus barred by Article I, Section 6.162 The
Court denied standing, on the grounds that the plaintiff had shown no direct injury
specific to him and that a generalized grievance held in common with all citizens was
insufficient.
Private litigants may have standing to challenge the validity of the appointment
of a judge hearing their case, as in Noel Canning.163 (If the office is one for which
such private claim of injury could not or would not likely arise, then the case for
senatorial standing would be stronger, and would be strengthened if the Senate as a
whole adopted a resolution authorizing such litigation.) Claims about recess
appointments, in particular, might be regarded as so limited a potential group as not

159. Id. at 28–30.
160. See id. at 26 (describing the case as a “petition, in the name of the United States, for
a writ of quo warranto . . . filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on relation
of the district attorney, in deference to the desire of the United States Senate to have presented
for judicial decision the question whether George Otis Smith holds lawfully the office of
member and chairman of the Federal Power Commission”).
161. 302 U.S 633 (1937) (per curiam). Levitt is described in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1973):
The petition asserted that the appointment and confirmation of the Justice in
August 1937 was unlawful because the Act of March 1, 1937, permitting Justices
to retire at full salary after a period of specified service, thereby increased the
emoluments of the office and that the statute was enacted while the challenged
Justice was a Senator.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”).
163. See also, e.g., Ryder v United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501
U.S. 868 (1991).
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to pose major risks to either the role of the courts or intergovernmental relations
between the political branches if standing were expanded. On the other hand, such
claims—like those that an executive agreement was really a treaty requiring Senate
confirmation—involve congressional voting that has not yet occurred, arguably
representing a somewhat weaker claim of institutional injury and in many instances,
presenting an issue that a privately injured litigant could raise.
5. War
As to war powers, repeated efforts to invoke Article III jurisdiction to enjoin
hostilities have failed, on various justiciability related grounds.164 As courts have
said, Congress has other remedies—including enacting laws concerning
appropriations for war or specific prohibitions on having troops in particular places;
the exercise of judicial power, some courts have concluded, is unnecessary.165 Yet as
other constitutional courts have recognized, the political realities are that once troops
are in hostilities, it is virtually impossible for a democratic legislature not to support
them; once troops are committed, the moment for exercising any constitutional
requirement for legislative approval in advance has in some sense been mooted by
facts on the ground. For this reason, the German Constitutional Court has required
advance legislative approval of decisions to commit troops outside of Germany in
circumstances in which hostilities are likely.166
Given the close relationship between issues of war making and potential injury to
an individual’s right not to be deprived of life without due process of law, as applied
to individual soldiers, there might be reasons sounding in commitment to individual
rights to entertain such suits when brought by military personnel challenging their
deployment as inconsistent with constitutional requirements for authorization of such
action.167 On the other hand, there may be other barriers of justiciability or prudence

164. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 135 (1st Cir. 2003) (ripeness); Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (standing); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455
(4th Cir. 1975) (political question); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (political
question); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (standing and political
question); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (ripeness).
165. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2011); Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); cf. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 2003)
(noting that Congress might still take some action in response to later developments in
analyzing why claim was not ripe).
166. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 841–53 (excerpting the AWACS II case,
Judgment of the Second Senate, 7 May 2008, 2 BvE 1/03). But it operates in a system that
specifically authorizes minority groups in the legislature to bring such claims to the
constitutional court.
167. As noted in text below, courts may have other reasons to find—especially once troops
are engaged—that adjudicating the issue of prior consent, or granting a remedy with
immediate effect, is a “political question” beyond judicial competence, in part because a court
simply may not feel it has the space to hold an ongoing action involving hostilities outside the
United States to be unconstitutional. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting as a
factor in treating issue as a nonjusticiable “political question” whether there was an “unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”).
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to such individual soldier actions: permitting suits by individual members of the
Armed Services against their Commander-in-Chief might be thought incompatible
with the Commander-in-Chief powers or to have too high a risk of involving courts
in areas outside their expertise or to have too great a risk of multiple and conflicting
judgments. And the relatively higher profile issues of a full-scale “war” may be such
as to render political remedies—including elections, if not legislative restraint
through the appropriation power—a more plausible “check” on Executive Branch
action inconsistent with Congress’s power to declare war than exists with the number
of the other issues discussed in this Part III.C. Even if individual soldier actions are
barred from suit, it would not necessarily follow that individual Members of
Congress should have standing; a stronger case for standing would exist if one house
itself authorizes the specific challenge, given the magnitude of the question and the
need—if the constitutional challenge were sustained—for both houses to “declare
War.”
6. Foreign Emoluments
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution provides, in part, that “no Person
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” This infrequently
considered provision was designed to respond to the then-common practice by
European monarchs of showering favored emissaries with expensive gifts, a practice
that could create awkward situations for those wishing neither to offend a foreign
sovereign nor appear (or become) corrupted.168 A famous example was when French
King Louis XVI provided Benjamin Franklin a jewel-laden snuff box; Franklin
reported it to the Continental Congress, which gave him permission to keep the
gift.169 The Foreign Emoluments Clause provides a prophylactic form of protection,
going beyond the common law bans on bribery.170

That some challenges might be deemed nonjusticiable political questions does not necessarily
mean that all such challenges—for example, ones brought prior to significant troop
movements—would do so.
168. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 1–3, 24 (2014).
169. Id. at 25–26.
170. See, e.g., id. at 28 (emphasizing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause by its terms
excludes gifts “of any kind whatever” and “forbids presents—not bribes”); see also LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 18–19
(2011); NORMAN L. EISEN, RICHARD PAINTER & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE EMOLUMENTS
CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 6–7 (2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emolumentsclause1.pdf [https://perma.cc/82GC-SPCW]. The most recent opinion of the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel on the issue treats the Foreign Emoluments Clause as
applicable to the President. See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts
and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. (Dec.
7, 2009), 2009 WL 6365082, at *4; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(1)(E) (2012) (applying to
President and Vice President prohibition on accepting foreign gifts except under circumstances
specified in the statute); Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 30, 40–48 (2012) (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause extends to elected
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The provision is not an absolute bar but makes the constitutionality of accepting
such gifts depend entirely on Congress’s approval. It is a default rule, anticipatory in
character,171 not dependent on a corrupt intent by either the giver or accepter.172
Acceptance of an unauthorized emolument creates a public harm that as to private
parties is likely to be generalized rather than concrete.173 Under U.S. case law an
interest in seeing that the law, statutory or constitutional, is complied with is, by
itself, insufficient to afford standing.174 Indeed, in United States v. Richardson,175 the
Court rejected taxpayer standing to challenge an asserted failure to comply with the
Constitution’s command, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that “a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time,” arising from the secrecy of some details of the CIA’s budget; it
even suggested that if there was no foreseeable private litigant with concrete injury,
this would suggest that the issue was a nonjusticiable political question.176

office). Contra Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
180, 185–95 (2012). For discussion of their disagreement, see Amandeep S. Grewal, The
Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639, 645–49 (2017).
171. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 7.
172. See supra note 170; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (providing terms on which Congress consents
to acceptance of gifts from foreign governments by federal officers or employees including
the President and not including any explicit mens rea requirement).
173. A private group of restaurant owners joined one of the pending lawsuits against
President Trump based on the Emoluments Clause, arguing competitive injury to their
restaurants arising from the desire of foreign governments and businesses to curry favor with
the Trump Administration by using his competing hotels and other services. The district court
granted the government’s motion to dismiss their claim (along with that of a public interest
organization) for lack of standing. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump,
No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD), 2017 WL 6524851 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017). The district court found
a failure adequately to allege that any receipt of emoluments caused any competitive injury or
that any such injury would be redressable, due to the intervening effects of numerous third
party acts, id. at 13–14, and because competitive injuries do not fall within the zone of interest
of the Emoluments Clause, id. at 15–17. The zone of interests arguments, if accepted by other
courts, would pose a considerable barrier to standing for other private parties.
174. For pending efforts to assert Emoluments Clause claims by nonfederal government
entities, see Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-GBD
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017); District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md.
June 12, 2017). The federal district court recently held that the private party plaintiffs lacked
standing. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 2017 WL 6524851.
175. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
176. Id. at 179 (“In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to
litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”). In another case, rejecting
taxpayer and citizen standing to challenge the Reserve Officer membership of Members of
Congress as a violation of the incompatibility clause of Article I, Section 6, clause 2, the Court
expounded at length on the idea that standing cannot be predicated on undifferentiated injuries
to all members of the public:
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily
abstract nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or
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However, with respect to Members of Congress, there could be an additional
injury if an officer of the United States has accepted an emolument without its
consent—an injury to their prerogative to vote on whether it is permissible for an
officer to accept the particular emolument.177 That is, Members of Congress could
assert a violation, or “nullification,” of their constitutional authority to decide
whether to consent to the acceptance of foreign emoluments.178 Unlike the claims of
legislators in Raines v. Byrd, who had the opportunity to vote on the legislation they
challenged, but lost, and whose claims of future injury were conjectural and subject
to multiple political remedies, Emoluments Clause claims may allege that no vote
was taken, no consent given, to the receipt of a specific foreign emolument.
That the Emoluments Clause requires consent to legalize receipt of a gift,
moreover, may mean that there are fewer political mechanisms available to Members
of Congress to resolve dispute over the matter. The clause does not involve
substantive legislation or appropriations, and thus new legislation may not provide a
solution; viewing new legislation as a remedy is, moreover, arguably, inconsistent
with where the Constitution places the burden of inertia. As to impeachment, a
prominent speaker in the Virginia Ratifying Convention referred to its violation as

threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast
it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential
dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party
have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful.
This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant
authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse
consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance.
Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a
court must rely on the parties’ treatment of the facts and claims before it to
develop its rules of law.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to End the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1973).
177. For a currently pending case based on legislator standing, see Blumenthal v. Trump,
No. 1-17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017).
178. For arguments in favor of legislative standing to raise the Emoluments Clause issue,
see Matthew Hall, Who Has Standing To Sue the President over Allegedly Unconsstitutional
Emoluments?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 767–74 (2017); Brianne J. Gorod, Congressional
Standing Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, TAKE CARE (June 19, 2017), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/congressional-standing-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition [https://
perma.cc/CDA3-KSK6]; G. Michael Parsons, Raines Check: Legislator Standing and the
Separation of Powers, TAKE CARE (July 10, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/rainescheck-legislator-standing-and-the-separation-of-powers
[https://perma.cc/PN6Y-MCPC];
Richard Primus, Two Thoughts on the Government’s Motion to Dismiss in the CREW
Emoluments Case, BALKINAZATION (June 9, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/twothoughts-on-governments-motion-to.html [https://perma.cc/56NU-RFHC]; Eric Segall,
Members of Congress Have Standing in the Emoluments Suit, TAKE CARE (June 24, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/members-of-congress-have-standing-in-the-emoluments-suit
[https://perma.cc/M3GU-VNHP]. For differing views, see Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty,
Congressional Democrats To File Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump, WASH. POST (June 14,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congressional-democrats-to-file-emolumentslawsuit-against-trump/2017/06/13/270e60e6-506d-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DKV9-XNEF] (quoting Professor Grewal as suggesting that individual
legislators would lack standing but that Congress as a body could sue).
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amounting to an impeachable offense.179 But the prophylactic character of the
Clause, as well as the civil character of the statute Congress enacted regulating
foreign gifts,180 might be argued to exclude its violation from offenses warranting
impeachment.181 Even if the Impeachment Clause is construed to authorize
impeachment and removal for actions that are not technically crimes,182 including

179. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 9 (noting that Edmund Jennings Randolph spoke
of the possibility of the President being removed from office by impeachment for violation of
this provision at the Virginia Ratifying Convention); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A
CITIZEN’S GUIDE 58–59 (2017) (to similar effect); STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13–15
(Comm. Print 1974) (to similar effect); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 90, at 2236 & n.178
(suggesting that impeachment could be a remedy for violation of conflict of interest
provisions, including the Foreign Emoluments Clause).
180. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342(h) (2012) (providing civil penalties for violation of the statute’s
prohibition on receipt of foreign gifts).
181. See, e.g., IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 81–82 (1972)
(concluding that “[t]he Constitution did not make honest error impeachable”); PETER CHARLES
HOFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805, at 118 (1984) (arguing that a
“corrupt motive” is needed). But whether a wrongful motive is required, whether the conduct
must violate a criminal statute, and whether, at least with respect to the President, it must
involve an abuse of public office that is great or repeated, are hotly contested. See, e.g., STAFF
OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13–15, 21, 23–25, 27 (concluding that at the time of the
Founding, the phrase “other high crimes and misdemeanors” was understood to “reach[]
offenses against the government, and especially abuses of constitutional duties,” and was not
limited to formal criminal conduct); ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-186,
IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE
26, 30 (2010); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 89–91
(1973); ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES 13, 321–22 (1992);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 36, 48 (arguing that the phrase in English law referred to serious
offenses even if not technically crimes and that it was intended to apply to “abuses of official
power”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
603, 617 (1999) (referring to the three articles of impeachment voted by the House Committee
against President Nixon to suggest that impeachable offenses need not be crimes but do need
to have a connection to the official’s office and constitute an injury to the constitutional order).
My sense is that the better view is that impeachable offenses are not limited to violation of
criminal statutes but embrace conduct that is an abuse of office. In addition to sources cited,
see 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 764
(1851) (impeachment was not limited to specific criminal offenses but “has a more enlarged
operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, political offenses, growing out of personal
misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the
discharge of the duties of political office”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander
Hamilton) (stating that “[t]he subjects of [a well-constituted impeachment court] are those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse
or violation of some public trust. . . . [and] are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety
be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself.”) (emphasis omitted).
182. Two of the three articles of impeachment voted by the House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee against President Richard Nixon asserted misconduct that did not clearly
charge a crime, but one of them clearly sounded in a wrongful abuse of office. The first count
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presidential breaches of the Emoluments Clause, impeachment is a legally uncertain
remedy for such a breach.
Even if an alleged violation of the Emoluments Clause arising from receipt of a
gift without consent were understood to create a concrete, “complete nullification”
type of injury, it is doubtful that standing should be recognized for a single member
of Congress.183 Unlike the situation in Kennedy v. Sampson, where a bill was voted
upon and Senator Kennedy was among those voting in favor, where no vote at all
has occurred the concreteness and particularity of any given member’s claim is
somewhat attenuated. The Court’s hesitation to fully embrace procedural theories of
standing—or the degree to which its willingness to accept such procedural theories
depends highly on context—suggests that in fraught separation of powers contexts,
it would be particularly hesitant to entertain a suit absent concrete reason to believe
the judicial intervention would matter. However, if a house of Congress were itself
to bring the claim, or conceivably if the plaintiff group included enough members to
block or create real doubt that an affirmative vote in one house could occur, such
factors might help support standing.
This standing issue is difficult. Some of the factors I have identified as relevant—
the availability of private persons who could claim specific injury; or the presence of
obvious political remedies given by the Constitution to the Congress—are at best
uncertain, and alleged violations of this constitutional rule may be of real importance:
Maintaining an Executive Branch free of potentially corrupting foreign government
influences might be a predicate for both traditional judicial deference to presidential
findings and a range of implied executive prerogatives the Court has found the
Constitution to provide.184 Identifying a “foreign gift,” while not free from

alleged an obstruction of justice, a crime; the second count alleged a failure to take care that
the laws were faithfully executed and taking action in violation of the constitutional rights of
citizens, a clear abuse of office; and the third count alleged a willful failure to produce
documents in response to a subpoena. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (6th
ed. 2009).
183. Recall, as indicated at the outset, that it would not be logically inconceivable to treat
a single member of the legislature as having a specific injury caused by the alleged denial of
a right to vote on the issue; and if this were sufficient to state a claim of injury, it would be
remediable by holding a vote. But as stated there, the traditional elements of standing for
private parties are less helpful in distinguishing among different claims for standing for
Members of Congress. In Kennedy v. Sampson, a single Senator’s standing to challenge a
pocket veto was upheld; but, as noted above, Senator Kennedy was part of the majority that
had already voted a bill out of Congress, providing a specificity to his claim that the Congress’s
vote had been completely nullified. In other pre-Raines cases the D.C Circuit had upheld
standing for a small number of Members of Congress, but in Moore v. U.S. House of
Representatives, for example, the Origination Clause challenge to enacted legislation was held
nonjusticable on equitable separation of powers grounds because relief could be sought from
other Members of Congress, see supra note 135, and in Goldwater v. Carter, the Court of
Appeals had adjudicated on the merits a claim that a treaty could not be unilaterally terminated
by the President, but the Supreme Court found the claim nonjusticiable. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
184. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (noting
the Court’s “customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs”);
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ambiguity, is both less difficult and the need to do so would likely be more rare than,
for example, distinguishing executive agreements from treaties;185 the relative rarity
of the issue arising would mean that if standing were accepted here it would not
necessarily imply a significant broadening of the courts’ jurisdiction over potential
interbranch controversies. The specificity of the issue and the critical role of
congressional consent in fulfilling the Constitution’s mandate, together with the
uncertainty about the effectiveness of political remedies, taken together might
support congressional standing by a large enough plaintiff group.186 Although these
are factors that might favor congressional standing, Congress would have other

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (noting the “respect owed the President as
Commander in Chief”); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (finding implied absolute
immunity from civil damages for actions by the President in office); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937) (inferring from the President’s power to receive Ambassadors the
exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and incidental powers related thereto); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (inferring substantial presidential
discretion in foreign affairs).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 147–151.
186. It is unclear whether the challenging group would need to be both houses or one house
of Congress, or a group whose votes “would have been sufficient to defeat” consent, Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997), or whether even a smaller group of congressional members
might be found to have standing—the latter on the theory that part of the Emoluments Clause’s
anti-corruption mechanism was to require Members of Congress to vote, thereby making
individual Members accountable. It is also unclear whether an effort to obtain consent would
need to have been made and failed in the Congress, before a court would consider the issue
concretely enough exhausted in the political branches to make it prudent to adjudicate or ripe
for adjudication. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 996–97 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding
the treaty termination issue not yet ripe); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding war powers issue not yet ripe); see also
Harrison, supra note 125, at 129 (arguing that “Raines implies that a particular vote is
ineffective, completely nullified, and deprived of all validity, when a bill that had enough votes
to pass and ‘would have become law’ is ‘deemed defeated’ and ‘does not go into effect,’ or
when a bill with enough votes to be defeated ‘goes into effect’”). The number of legislators
bringing an action might also bear on the D.C. Circuit’s older “circumscribed equitable
discretion” doctrine, where, if the challenging Member of Congress could obtain relief through
action of his or her fellow legislators, courts would decline to hear the case regardless of
whether the requirements for standing are met. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 114
(D.C. Cir 1999) (explaining that this doctrine had been previously invoked to dismiss a claim
where a Member of Congress could “obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators,”
Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (1981), but suggesting that, post-Raines,
this factor goes to standing itself). Later case law seems to treat the possible availability of a
legislative remedy as bearing on the presence of cognizable injury through “complete
nullification” of the legislator’s voting power. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (treating the possibility that congressional plaintiffs could obtain a legislative
remedy, including prohibitory legislation, appropriation cut off, or even impeachment, as
going to whether there was the kind of injury—nullification of their votes in the future—
needed for standing). Where, however, the Constitution affirmatively requires congressional
consent to make lawful certain acts, making the act of voting necessary to legalize certain
conduct, it is arguable that a requirement of having sought or being able to win a vote should
have no place.
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political remedies—holding hearings, for example, or threatening not to appropriate
funds for programs the President cares about—that, even if not directly related to the
allegedly unlawful conduct, might be effective in encouraging compliance.187 The
standing issue here, thus, remains a close one.
D. Appropriations, Legislative Vesting, and Take Care Clause
By contrast to claims based on a complete deprivation of the right of Members of
Congress to vote on narrow and specific issues, claims under the Appropriations,
Legislative Vesting, and Take Care Clauses have greater potential for expanding
interbranch litigation. An Appropriations Clause claim argues that some part of the
government is expending or committing funds of the United States without an
appropriations law, in violation of the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7,
which states that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law.” A Legislative Vesting Clause claim argues that
executive action amounts to lawmaking in violation of Article I, Section 1, which
vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in the Congress. Take Care Clause
claims allege that the President is in violation of obligations under Article II, Section
3, stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
The Appropriations Clause is not limited to executive officials, so in theory action
by judicial or legislative officers may create Appropriations Clause violations; to the
extent that statutory law limits drawing of funds to Treasury officials,188 they may
play an intermediary role for other government officials. Appropriations Clause
objections may overlap with Legislative Vesting or Take Care Clause claims: to the
extent that a statute is claimed either not to appropriate funds or affirmatively to
prohibit expenditure of funds in a certain way, challengers might argue that the
Executive Branch has failed to “take care” that a law enacted by Congress has been
faithfully executed or that the Executive Branch action is in derogation of the
exclusive vesting of the “legislative” power in Congress. But Legislative Vesting or
Take Care Clause claims can have an even greater breadth, encompassing in theory
virtually any interpretive disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch.
Both sets of issues arise in a pending case in the D.C. Circuit, involving challenges
to how the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was being administered. In U.S. House of
Representatives v. Burwell,189 the district court rejected claims of standing based on
the Legislative Vesting Clause (on reasoning that would apply by implication to the

187. For example, Congress has legislated in some detail on the circumstances in which it
has consented to receipt of gifts from foreign governments. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012)
(establishing conditions under which Congress consents to an employee of the United States,
including the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, accepting gifts from
foreign donors, including a dollar amount under which retention of the gift is permitted,
exempting defined “decorations” from the ban, and requiring reporting and turning over to the
United States of gifts above a set amount in value, among others).
188. See Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/T5AQ-SKE8] (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) (noting that the Department is responsible
for “paying all bills of the U.S.”).
189. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015).
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Take Care Clause),190 but upheld congressional standing to allege a violation of the
Appropriations Clause of Article I, Section 9. The House argued that in making
payments the ACA required to be paid to insurers for “cost-sharing offsets,” the
Administration violated the Appropriations Clause because there was no
appropriation to support the payment.191 The Administration responded that a
permanent appropriation in § 1324, which both sides agreed covered payment for
“premium tax credits,” also covered the cost-sharing offsets, in light of the “structure
and design” of “intertwined subsidies;”192 this position was also supported by the
House Democratic leadership in its amicus brief supporting Burwell, in light of
statutory language that the cost-sharing offsets “shall” be paid.193
The district court distinguished constitutional claims that monies were spent
without an appropriation from claims that the Administration was misinterpreting
and misapplying the statute; it dismissed counts alleging that the expenditures were
in violation of § 1324 as a “statutory” question on which the House lacked standing194
But it upheld standing on the claimed violations of the Appropriations Clause,195 a
theory that appears to turn on the meaning of this same statutory provision. Where
an administration agrees that an appropriation is required, but argues that the statute
provides for it, the constitutional question turns entirely on issues of statutory
interpretation. This illustrates the expansive possibilities if standing on
Appropriations Clause claims is upheld.
While the district court found “injury in fact” because Congress is the only body
authorized to enact laws authorizing expenditures,196 this is true for all lawmaking

190. When the Speaker of the House sought approval of a resolution to bring the action in
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, he invoked the Take Care Clause. See ALISSA M.
DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44450, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES V. BURWELL AND
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING TO SUE 1 (2016) (“In his public comments prior to introduction of
H.Res. 676, Speaker John Boehner stated that the purpose of the suit would be to compel the
President to follow his oath of office and comply with his constitutional responsibility to ‘take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”). The complaint itself, however, couched the
challenge in terms of the legislative power being vested only in Congress, to be exercised
through the bicameralism and presentment requirements. In this context, at least, the
Legislative Vesting and Take Care Clause claims seem like mirror image ways of making the
same basic claim. Cf. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing
Take Care Clause challenge to Executive Branch’s program of Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (DAPA)), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
191. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 70–71.
192. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 175–81 (D.D.C.
2016), appeal held in abeyance by 676 F. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (mem.).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(3)(A) (2012), discussed in Brief Amici Curiae of Members of
Congress in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 5, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (No. 16-5202) (placing weight on the statute’s use of the word “shall” in
describing government obligations to make the contested payments).
194. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 75–76.
195. See id. at 74.
196. Id. at 71. The district court also suggested that the Appropriations Clause was a
“specific” kind of injury, one based on a “prohibition.” Id. at 79. But the Appropriations Clause
is far less specific than many grants of authority to Congress, and its passive voice prohibition
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authority. The district court reasoned that the “constitutional structure would
collapse, and the role of the House would be meaningless, if the Executive could
circumvent the appropriations process and spend funds however it pleases.”197 That
may be correct, but no one argued that the President could spend without an
appropriation.198
Where there is a good faith interpretive dispute about the scope of an
appropriation, the availability and adequacy of legislative countermeasures—
discussed in Raines v. Byrd—is clear, indeed, more so on appropriations than almost
any other subject of legislation. Congress pays a great deal of attention to such issues
in its legislative process; it frequently enacts affirmative prohibitions on spending
(but did not do so in the ACA provisions at issue in this case). Disagreements over
expenditures and their authority go back to the Founding; they exist across historical
periods; and they have been consistently addressed politically, either through
oversight or new legislation. (Indeed, as early as the 1790s there were
acknowledgments in Congress that what the text of an appropriation law might be
thought to require is different from the interpretive practice or custom199—a tricky
thing for a court to penetrate accurately, especially during a time of heightened
hyperpolarization.)

is far more general. On the other hand, violations of this clause involving expenditures not
authorized by law are unlikely to create concrete injuries for individuals (except to the extent
that expenditures from a limited fund established for one purpose diminishes funds available
for others). To the extent congressional standing were to be recognized for violations of this
clause, it would be important to develop some internal limit, for example, where there is no
arguable basis for the claim of statutory authority. See infra text accompanying notes 198, 206.
197. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at at 71.
198. In Allen v. Wright, the Court described the challengers’ claim that methods established
by the IRS to prevent granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools were
ineffective towards that goal and thus invalid. 468 U.S. 737, 740–45 (1984). In denying
standing, the Court incorporated separation of powers concerns in its analysis. See id. at 760–
61. These concerns, the Court wrote, “counsel[] against recognizing standing in a case brought,
not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties,”
id. at 761, thereby suggesting that while the IRS retained some discretion over how to enforce
the law, it did not dispute its legal duty to do so. See also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 844
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, J., dissenting) (“What the plaintiffs actually challenge here is the
adequacy of agency enforcement procedures . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737.
199. See WILMERDING, supra note 60, at 28–29 (describing how in the 1790s, Treasury
interpretations of spending authorities were uniform notwithstanding changes in statutory
wording); id. at 48 (quoting a Federalist member of Congress in 1801 explaining that a practice
of using money for one subject within a department for another was the custom, which was
“illegal; but its being the custom palliates it”); id. at 78 (noting that in 1816 the practice of
ignoring limitations in appropriations laws had “reached so high a pitch” it attracted Calhoun's
attention); id. at 92 (noting an objection around 1820 to criticizing a department for ignoring
a limit because all departments did). Wilmerding concluded that an 1874 law changed practice,
id. at 130, but did not eliminate problems created by the practice of underappropriation, in the
expectation that departments would exceed budgets and make up the rest with deficiency bills,
id. at 141.
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In Raines v. Byrd the Court also noted that the suit was not being brought by the
houses of Congress as an institutional matter, although the statute authorized
individual actions.200 Here, the litigation was authorized by the House, but it was not
authorized by a statute (enacted through the bicameral process); nor did both houses
of Congress appear together, as in Chadha. While it may be less likely that an
individual would have standing to challenge expenditures than it was likely (in
Raines v. Byrd) that a private party would challenge non-expenditures, the Congress
has ample political measures that can be invoked, including new substantive and
appropriations legislation. Moreover, it could put courts in a very difficult position
if one house of Congress had standing to challenge Executive Branch action and the
other house had standing to defend Executive Branch action201—a possible result
should one-house legislative standing be recognized outside of cases where the
Constitution authorizes one house to act alone.202 These reasons together—the
expansive nature of the theory, the variance from historical practice, the availability
of legislative countermeasures, the absence of any prohibition on the disputed
spending, the absence of statutory authorization for suit, and the presence of only one

200. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
201. This is not a fanciful possibility. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the
Senate had opposed the provision, sought and defended by the House, to strip three specific
civil servants of their jobs. See id. at 312–13 (reporting also the President’s statement, in
signing the bill, that “The Senate yielded, as I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our
conduct of the war. But I cannot so yield without placing on record my view that this provision
is not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.”). The House participated as
amicus in the litigation, the Senate did not. In both Dickerson and Windsor, Democratic
Members of Congress filed amicus briefs taking positions opposite those taken by the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House (a group entirely controlled by the majority
party). See Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 618–19; cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2004) (noting the difference in views of the mother, who was
the custodial parent, and the father, with respect to their daughter hearing the Pledge of
Allegiance in school as a factor supporting the conclusion that the father lacked prudential
standing to assert the claim based on his relationship with the child). (If a house has standing
to challenge, or to defend, executive action as inconsistent, or consistent, with a statute, and if
the Executive Branch’s action is struck down in the trial court but the Executive Branch
decides not to appeal, the house defending the Executive Branch action could nonetheless take
an appeal, creating the potential for significant intrusion on the Executive Branch’s “take care”
responsibilities to control litigation for the government.)
202. For discussion of whether participating as a party in litigation involving enforcement
laws would enable parts of Congress to do what they otherwise could not do except through
the bicameral and presentment process under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 955–56
(1983) (holding that when Congress or a part thereof takes action that has “the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative
branch,” its action must ordinarily be achieved through the processes of bicameral enactment
and presentment to the President required by Article I Section 7, unless the procedure is
explicitly authorized, e.g., treaty approval by the Senate), see Grove & Devins, supra note
102, at 627; see also Grove, supra note 21, at 1350–51, 1363–64 (providing normative reasons,
sounding in part in liberty interests, against legislative standing to challenge Executive Branch
litigation positions).
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house—should probably have led to a different result on the standing of the House
to bring the action.203
Take Care and Legislative Vesting Clause claims for congressional standing are
especially worrisome. Any disagreement over how a statute is administered can be
reframed as a violation of the President’s Take Care Clause responsibilities (and correspondingly, an attenuated deprivation of Congress’s right to vote to enact legislation). As the district court wrote, “[t]he argument proves too much”;204 to allow
standing on such claims would involve a large expansion of judicial authority to resolve partisan disagreements over statutory interpretation.205 As with Appropriations
Clause claims, there may be a judicially manageable distinction capable of being
drawn between a presidential administration asserting an interpretive position about
the meaning of a statute, on the one hand, and claiming that no statutory authority is
required, on the other; or between an interpretive position asserted in good faith and
one beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretive possibilities.206 But recognition of

203. See supra text accompanying notes 85–103.
204. “The argument proves too much. If it were accepted, every instance of an extrastatutory action by an Executive officer might constitute a cognizable constitutional violation,
redressable by Congress through a lawsuit. Such a conclusion would contradict decades of
administrative law and [constitutional] precedent . . . .” U.S. House of Representatives v.
Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2015).
205. Indeed, the Court has recently noted the impact of partisan affiliation with legal
judgments made by the Congress. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2015) (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in dissent, maintains that,
under the Elections Clause, the state legislature can trump any initiative-introduced
constitutional provision regulating federal elections. He extracts support for this position from
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess., 46–47 (1866). There, Michigan voters had amended the State Constitution to
require votes to be cast within a resident’s township or ward. The Michigan Legislature,
however, passed a law permitting soldiers to vote in other locations. One candidate would win
if the State Constitution’s requirement controlled; his opponent would prevail under the
Michigan Legislature’s prescription. The House Elections Committee, in a divided vote, ruled
that, under the Elections Clause, the Michigan Legislature had the paramount power. As the
minority report in Baldwin pointed out, however, the Supreme Court of Michigan had reached
the opposite conclusion, holding, as courts generally do, that state legislation in direct conflict
with the State’s constitution is void. Baldwin, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, at 50. The Baldwin
majority's ruling, furthermore, appears in tension with the Election Committee’s unanimous
decision in Shiel just five years earlier. . . . Finally, it was perhaps not entirely accidental that
the candidate the Committee declared winner in Baldwin belonged to the same political party
as all but one member of the House Committee majority responsible for the decision. In short,
Baldwin is not a disposition that should attract this Court's reliance.”) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
206. Public decision makers, including courts, are called on in other settings to make
judgments about whether arguments are made in good faith or go beyond the bounds of
reasonableness. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (requiring that attorneys sign court filings to
certify that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
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legislative standing to challenge actions under the Legislative Vesting, Take Care, or
Appropriations Clauses should be viewed with the greatest of caution, because of the
expansive potential they have to substantially expand interbranch litigation and judicial intervention in fraught disputes between coequal branches of government.207
IV. COURTS, DEMOCRACY, STANDING, AND POLITICAL PATHOLOGIES
I conclude by revisiting my earlier concerns about whether expanding congressional standing may pose risks both to courts and to democracy.
First, entertaining such actions increases the occasions of direct confrontation
with other branches and invites courts to make decisions on sensitive separation of
powers issues on which they have little comparative advantage and limited ability to
enforce their judgments. The risks of courts getting structural issues wrong is high,
as is the likelihood over the long run of the courts engendering hostility from one or
more political branches in ways that could interfere with the exercise of the courts’
central role in protecting individual rights.208 Even once highly effective courts may
find themselves in fraught circumstances, as experience elsewhere suggests.
Second, increased legislative standing poses potential risks for effective representative government. Here I draw on the work of political scientist Aurelain Craiutu

establishing new law . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–
54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the challenge to the Senate’s
use of a committee to hear evidence in impeachment trial was nonjusticiable, but suggesting
that the result might be different were the Senate to use a coin flip); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (holding that ordinarily agency discretion to enforce is not subject
to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, but noting that it was not reaching a
“situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly
adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities”) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc);
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J.) (noting that courts should
not condemn Presidential action in area of broad discretion “except in a case of clear abuse
amounting to bad faith”) (emphasis added); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 255 (1998)
(suggesting that the impeachment trial of federal judge Samuel Chase established that
Congress could not “elevate a legitimate difference of opinion into a high crime or
misdemeanor”).
207. Interestingly, the Court has been especially reluctant to recognize private parties’
standing to compel government to enforce the law against third parties. See Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493
(2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973)
(finding nonjusticiable challenge, by mother of child born out-of-wedlock, to prosecutor’s
discriminatory policy of not enforcing child support obligations of fathers of out-of-wedlock
children). But it is surely more consistent with the way the constitutional system has operated
to allow private parties to bring such actions than to expand existing boundaries of
congressional standing. See also infra note 218 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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on moderation. In his recent book, he argues that moderation is “an essential ingredient in the functioning of all open societies because it acts as a buffer against extremism and promotes a civil form of politics indispensable to the smooth running of
democratic institutions.”209 Moderation can be exercised by persons of the left or of
the right; it requires a certain epistemic humility, an awareness that those with whom
one disagrees may have something of value to contribute.210
Moderation is linked, he argues, to a willingness to compromise.211 And in a heterogeneous democracy, compromise is often needed to allow governance to happen.
For Craiutu, no democratic “regime can properly function without compromise, bargaining, and moderation”; indeed, he says, “the proper functioning of our representative system and institutions depends to a great extent on political moderation.”212
Rather, “a democratic world is a chronically imperfect one . . . which can survive
only if the main political actors do not act as if their positions and ideas were absolute
and universally valid.”213 Craiutu is not alone in emphasizing the importance of moderation as an essential aspiration of law. For Karol Soltan, moderation is an aspect of
civic life essential to combat human destructiveness,214 and is a project of law that
“cannot be sustained without support from outside the courts.”215

209. AURELIAN CRAIUTU, FACES OF MODERATION: THE ART OF BALANCE IN AN AGE OF
EXTREMES 5 (2017).
210. Id. at 10, 239, 241.
211. See, e.g., id. at 25–33.
212. Id. at 17. It takes courage to be moderate, he argues, to pursue the “art of balance,”
between often good but competing principles based on understanding that most public issues
involve tradeoffs between “two partially true points of view.” Id.; see also Karol Edward
Soltan, Constitutional Patriotism and Militant Moderation, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 96, 99–101
(2008) (arguing for “militant moderation”). Soltan argues that moderation is a better political
theory for constitutionalism than is liberalism; for him, moderation requires a commitment to
“moral pluralism,” an attention to balancing important values, and a commitment to the need
to justify action with good reasons. Id. at 100.
213. CRAIUTU, supra note 209, at 243.
214. See Karol Edward Soltan, The Project of Law, Moderation, and the Global
Constitution, 25 MD. J. INT'L L. 230, 237 (2010) [hereinafter Soltan, The Project of Law]
(“[L]aw cannot be seen as the application of one logically coherent theory. So law does not
maximize wealth. And law is not fully captured . . . by, say, a Rawlsian theory of justice or a
Dworkinian principle of equality. Balancing and proportionality are at the heart of the rule of
law, including balancing between principles and rules.”) (footnotes omitted). For Soltan, “the
project of law [is that of] serving moderation through courts.” Id. (emphasis omitted). His
concept of moderation is based on impartial rationality, pluralism, and opposition to
destructiveness. See also Karol Edward Soltan, The Missing Alternative, 47 TULSA L. REV.
185, 187 (2011) (“Moderation as a generic form of politics can be seen as centered on three
principles. First, it centers on opposition to forces of destruction, their power and effects.
Second, it manifests an appreciation of complexity, of ‘unity in diversity,’ of polycentricity
and pluralism, of various forms of attractive balance. And, finally, it supports forms of
rationalism that take human fallibility seriously.”).
215. Soltan, The Project of Law, supra note 214, at 242.
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In an age of hyperpolarization, opening up more avenues of litigation for
Members of Congress is unlikely to improve prospects for moderation and compromise in the political arena.216 Courts declare winners and losers, based on legal principles; legislatures should be the forum of good political compromise. To expand the
capacity of congressional actors to litigate political disputes with the Executive
Branch is not only a departure from existing practice but risks being fundamentally
corrosive of whatever hopes exist for regaining a sense of moderation, compromise,
and respect for one’s opposition in Congress.
Perhaps these hopes of returning to a congressional process with more place for
moderation and compromise will be fruitless. If so, perhaps resort to courts will come
to seem more necessary and the potential risks of greater resort to courts correspondingly lower, vis-à-vis a polarized, frozen, and unworkable status quo. But if courts
are to become more basic institutions of governance, it might be necessary to rethink
who is appointed, how, and for how long.
There are, to be sure, jurisdictions that separate less fiercely the domain of law
and politics. Constitutional courts in France and Germany, which can hear cases
brought by dissenting legislators, are typically staffed by a bench that includes members with considerable political experience; appointments are typically for eight- to
twelve-year nonrenewable terms, usually staggered.217 This structure provides regular political inputs to those courts. But the U.S. separation of powers system works
on different assumptions—that indefinite, “life” tenure better protects judicial independence from politics and thus better secures protection of individuals against majoritarian forces. Expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to hear disputes between
Congress and the Executive, without major changes in the appointment structure of
the federal judiciary, would likely result in greater tensions between the democratic
and the constitutionalist aspects of the U.S. system.
CONCLUSION
The purposes of democratic constitutionalism would thus be well served by recalling that not all interbranch disputes—even constitutional disputes—need to be
resolved in the courts. Waiting to resolve an issue may sometimes be the better
choice, in a society that values both democracy and constitutionalism. For it is most
important that the courts be available and have legitimacy to protect against excesses
of majoritarian processes that injure individuals.
At the same time, understanding the important role of courts in providing a forum
of principle for resolution of individual claims of injury and in enforcing the rule of
law would favor, as I discuss elsewhere, a more generous conception of injury for

216. The prospect of litigation by the losing side might be thought to provide incentives
for the stronger side to moderate its impositions on the weaker, as Daniel Francis has suggested
to me. But the hyperpolarization of the present moment means that interbranch claims may
often be invoked in distinctively partisan disputes, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006), where such litigation
seems unlikely to have such a moderating effect and more likely to reinforce “winner-takeall” attitudes prioritizing immediate partisan success over policy advancement.
217. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 538–40 (reproducing a chart showing the
structures, terms, and appointing authorities of constitutional courts).
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purposes of claims by individuals of violation of constitutional and statutory rights
than the Court has been willing to entertain in a number of areas.218 Bright line preclusive rules categorically denying standing for broad ranges of plaintiffs or claims
are neither necessary nor desirable, given the ease with which standing assertions
can be evaluated as a threshold matter and the role, as Professor Fallon has put it,
“not just [of] the provision of the Constitution under which a plaintiff brings suit, but
also . . . the nature of the governmental action or policy that a plaintiff seeks to challenge.”219 There may well be a need for flexibility in response to extraordinary instances of bad faith or overt lawlessness in evaluating institutional claims of injury
from one part of the government against another,220 where other mechanisms (of private suit, or political remedies) are likely to be unavailing. Ordinarily, though, it is
the better part of wisdom for courts to presume the good faith of other branches and
to continue to structure standing law on the assumption that most controversies between the branches are best addressed through political mechanisms.

218. See Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. L.J. 127 (2014) (criticizing decisions denying standing in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and Clapper v. Amnesty International, 568 U.S. 398
(2013)); Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State
Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1890–99 (2016) (criticizing the
decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
219. Fallon, supra note 103, at 1077.
220. For thoughtful discussion of both the tendency to make claims of bad faith in
American culture and the corresponding reluctance of the courts to ascribe bad faith to the
institutions of governance, see David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV.
885 (2016).

